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17Jan17
Report of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria regarding the incident of 02Aug16 in Aleppo and summary update of the activities carried out by the Fact-Finding Mission in 2016
Back to topUnited Nations
Security CouncilS/2017/45
Distr.: General
17 January 2017
Original: EnglishLetter dated 16 January 2017 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council
I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the two attached communications, dated 22 and 30 December 2016, respectively, which I received from Ahmet Üzümcü, Director General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (see annexes I and II).
The letter of 22 December 2016 transmits the report of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic regarding the incident of 2 August 2016, as reported in the note verbale of the Syrian Arab Republic number 69, dated 16 August 2016.
The letter of 30 December 2016 transmits a summary update of the activities carried out by the Fact-Finding Mission in 2016.
I should be grateful if you could bring the present letter and its annexes to the attention of the members of the Security Council.
(Signed) António Guterres
Annex I
I have the honour to transmit to you herewith my report entitled "Report of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria regarding the incident of 2 August 2016 as reported in the note verbale of the Syrian Arab Republic number 69, dated 16 August 2016" (see enclosure).
(Signed) Ahmet Üzümcü
Enclosure
OPCW
Technical SecretariatS/1444/2016
21 December 2016
Original: ENGLISHNOTE BY THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT
REPORT OF THE OPCW FACT-FINDING MISSION IN SYRIA REGARDING THE INCIDENT OF 2 AUGUST 2016 AS REPORTED IN THE NOTE VERBALE OF THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC NUMBER 69 DATED 16 AUGUST 2016TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Executive summary
2. Fact-finding mission background information
3. Initial deployment
4. Second deployment
5. Data analysis
6. Conclusions
7. Fact-finding mission mandated aims
8. Operational instructions
9. SignatureTABLE OF ANNEXES
Annex 1: List of correspondence with the National authority of the Syrian Arab Republic (English only)
Annex 2: List of information received/handed over during deployments (English only)
Annex 3: List of interviewees from the second deployment (English only)
Annex 4: Mapping of incident location (English only)
Annex 5: List of samples (English only)
Annex 6: Select sample photographs (English only)
Annex 7: List of material gathered during the interview process (English only)
Annex 8: Results of the analysis of samples received from FFM/007/16 conducted at the OPCW laboratory
1.1 At its Forty-Eighth Meeting, the OPCW Executive Council (hereinafter "the Council") adopted a decision entitled "Reports of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria" (EC-M-48/DEC.1, dated 4 February 2015) in which, inter alia, it requested the Director-General to provide information on the progress of the Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) and specific plans, schedules, and their implementation to the Council at its next regular session. In response to that request, the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter "the Secretariat") submitted a Note to address the future activities of the FFM (S/1255/2015*, dated 10 March 2015 and Add.1, dated 13 March 2015).
1.2 The Secretariat received Note Verbale 69 (dated 16 August 2016) from the Syrian Arab Republic, providing information about an incident in Al-Awamid, Aleppo, involving the alleged use of chemicals as a weapon. The note verbale included a request that the FFM "investigate a toxic gas attack which took place in Aleppo on August the 2nd, 2016".
1.3 Following this request, the Director-General dispatched a team to collect the facts pertinent to the alleged chemical incident as reported in the aforementioned note verbale. The FFM deployed on 4 September and 11 October 2016. The team was composed of OPCW inspectors and interpreters. During the deployment, the FFM conducted its investigation by collecting testimonies, reviewing documents and information provided by the Syrian authorities, and by visiting certain locations deemed of interest in the Damascus area. In total, the team conducted 25 interviews in relation to the reported incident.
1.4 Regarding the aforementioned alleged incident in Al-Awamid, the FFM is of the view that the persons affected in the incident may have, in some instances, been exposed to some type of non-persistent, irritating substance. The FFM considers that while the general clinical presentation of those affected in the incident is consistent with brief exposure to any number of chemicals or environmental insults, the visual and olfactory description of the potential irritant does not clearly indicate any specific chemical.
1.5 Furthermore, based on the evidence presented by the National Authority of the Syrian Arab Republic, the medical records that were reviewed, the results of the sample analyses, and the prevailing narrative from all of the interviews, the FFM cannot confidently determine whether or not a specific chemical was used as a weapon in the investigated incident. From the results of the analyses of the samples, the FFM is of the opinion that none of the chemicals identified are likely to be the cause of death of the casualties in the reported incident.
2. FACT-FINDING MISSION BACKGROUND INFORMATION
2.1 The Secretariat received Note Verbale 69 (dated 16 August 2016) from the Syrian Arab Republic requesting the OPCW to investigate a toxic gas attack that took place in Aleppo on 2 August 2016.
2.2 Contained in this note verbale was Letter No. 122 (dated 15 August 2016), which provided information regarding an incident that occurred in the Al-Awamid area of Aleppo on 2 August 2016. The information in this letter described an incident in which six people were killed and a further 20 people were injured when projectiles containing toxic gas were used. The note verbale further indicated that the casualties were transferred to the Zahi Azraq Hospital, Aleppo, where they were treated with oxygen, intravenous fluids, and antibiotics. The casualties were complaining of immediate burns in the face and eyes, with severe headaches and general lethargy, dryness of the mouth, and loss of consciousness. On arrival at the hospital, it appears that some of the casualties were agitated and exhibiting signs of a clouded consciousness. A number of laboratory analyses, including acetylcholinesterase analysis, were conducted. According to the letter, acetylcholinesterase levels were within normal range, and the possibility of Sarin was excluded. However, it was concluded that, due to the neurological symptoms, the likely agent was mustard, though a differential diagnosis could not exclude carbon monoxide or chlorine.
2.3 Letter No. 122 contained a request by the Syrian Arab Republic that the FFM should be tasked with looking into the allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic in order to investigate the described incident.
2.4 Letter No. 122 also contained the minutes of a meeting of a committee established by the Health Directorate to look into the described incident, a report from the Zahi Azraq Hospital (dated 4 August 2016), and an autopsy report issued by the Forensic Medicine Centre in the Aleppo Directorate.
2.5 The minutes of the meeting described the actions of the staff at the hospital and further details regarding areas that could improve the hospital's response to any future incidents.
2.6 The medical report listed the 20 casualties who were admitted to the emergency department of the Zahi Azraq Hospital on 2 August 2016. The report described a diverse range of symptoms that were exhibited by the casualties, as well as the treatment that was given. The report indicated that, though unconfirmed, the likely agent was mustard, with a differential diagnosis of carbon monoxide or chlorine. All of the admitted patients were discharged from the hospital in good health on the morning of 3 August 2016.
2.7 The autopsy report provided a description of one of the fatalities with a list of toxicological signs. It stated the cause of death as heart and respiratory failure, caused by an inhalation of a toxic gaseous substance.
3.1 The initial deployment was comprised of the mission team leader and three team members who carried out preparatory activities from 4 to 9 September 2016. This team conducted several meetings with the National Authority of the Syrian Arab Republic to discuss details of a follow-on deployment, and gathered information associated with the incident that the National Authority provided. This included medical records of casualties, names of individuals affected, and hospital staff.
3.2 Additionally, the team was allowed access to the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) in Barzi to inspect samples that were collected by the National Authority, and the team was able to take and secure splits of these samples for further analysis by the OPCW at a designated laboratory. A full list of collected documents and samples can be found in Annexes 2, 3, 5, and 8 to this report.
3.3 The composition of the team deployed from 4 to 9 September 2016 was as follows:
Advance team of the Fact-Finding Mission
No. Function Speciality 1. Team Leader Inspection Team Leader 2. Confidentiality Officer Analytical Chemist Inspector 3. Logistics Officer Chemical Weapons Munitions Specialist 4. Interpreter N/A 3.4 The advance team returned to OPCW Headquarters and commenced preparations for the second deployment, which included the development of the mandate, equipment and interview kit preparation, and other routine logistic and operational planning.
4.1 The second deployment was comprised of the Inspection Team Leader, Deputy Team Leader, three subteam members, and two interpreters; the team deployed from 11 to 20 October 2016.
Main composition of the Fact-Finding Mission
No. Function Speciality 1. Team Leader Inspection Team Leader 2. Deputy Team Leader Chemical Weapons Munition Specialist Inspector 3. Interview subteam member Analytical Chemist Inspector 4. Interview subteam member Analytical Chemist Inspector 5. Interview subteam member Advance Health and Safety Specialist Inspector 6. Interpreter N/A 7. Interpreter N/A 4.2 Upon arrival, the team met with the National Authority of the Syrian Arab Republic to hand over the mandate and discuss the mission plan for the coming days. This included notification of those to be interviewed, scheduled times for movements to the SSRC in Barzi to repackage and take custody of the previously secured samples, and the development of the investigative steps moving forward.
4.3 Over the course of the deployment, the team conducted 25 interviews with various individuals involved in the full scope of the incident. These individuals were chosen based on their qualifications and relationship to the incident, based on information provided by the National Authority of the Syrian Arab Republic during the first deployment. They included casualties, medical treatment personnel, National Authority representatives who retrieved samples from the hospital and incident site, as well as SSRC personnel who conducted the initial analysis of the collected samples. A list of those interviewed can be found in paragraph 4.4 below and Annex 3 to this report.
4.4 List of interviews conducted between 12 and 19 October 2016
List of Interviewees DCN Profession DCN Profession 10000 Soldier 10038 Civil Defence member 10001 Civil Defence member 10043 Resident doctor 10002 Firefighter 10045 Nurse 10003 Firefighter 10046 Civil Defence member 10004 Soldier 10047 Doctor, toxicologist 10005 Civil Defence member 10048 Emergency department doctor 10006 Firefighter 10049 Nurse 10013 Lab staff 10051 Internal medicine doctor 10032 Firefighter 10052 Firefighter 10034 Firefighter 10041 Chemist 10035 Firefighter 10040 Senior officer, Syrian Arab Army 10036 Firefighter 10044 Senior staff member, SSRC 10037 Senior firefighter 4.5 The FFM was provided with additional documentation, including X-rays and photographs, for this reported incident (see Annex 2 to this report).
4.6 The data analysis and methodology for interviews employed by the FFM was consistent with OPCW standard operating procedures and is further discussed in Section 5 of this report.
Data analysis methodology employed by the Fact-Finding Mission
5.1 The FFM inspectors conducted an analysis of the alleged incident, with a focus on identifying aspects related to the use of chemicals as a weapon. The analysis methodology used by the team to evaluate interviews and documents provided by the authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic is described in this report in paragraphs 5.4 to 5.7 under "Interview Analysis Methodology" and paragraph 5.37 under "Analysis of Information Provided to the Fact-Finding Mission in the Form of Documents and Services".
5.2 The analysis of the medical information provided to the FFM in the form of records, services, and testimonies collected by the team was carried out by the medical personnel within the FFM.
5.3 Both of the analyses specified in paragraphs 5.1 and 5.2 were taken into account in fulfilling the FFM's mandate.
Interview analysis methodology
5.4 The interview analysis methodology employed by the FFM allowed individual accounts to be collated into a prevailing narrative, where factual content could be extracted and reported according to the mandate. The various steps of this methodology are described in the paragraphs below.
5.5 First, the audio and video records of each interview conducted by the team were translated and transcribed into English by qualified interpreters in order to facilitate their thorough analysis.
5.6 Then, the verbal content of each interview (the video, audio, and transcripts thereof) was carefully reviewed by at least two FFM inspectors. In order to organise the individual responses, a timeline-based analysis table was produced. This allowed each respondent's description of locations, sights, sounds, smells, and actions to be categorised according to relevant variables. During the interview review process, the FFM inspectors matched the interviewees' responses with their respective variables in the analysis table. The result for each interview was a unique description of the evolving, sequential event, from the perspective of that individual interviewee. Once all relevant narratives had been individually assembled, they were compared against one another to identify commonalities and discrepancies.
5.7 Commonalities formed the basis of the prevailing narrative, and discrepancies were analysed to determine their significance. Given that some of the interviewees were themselves casualties and that there were significant ongoing combat operations in the area, the FFM anticipated reasonable discrepancies in the events recalled from respondents. In cases where discrepancies were minor or of little consequence to establishing a prevailing narrative (i.e., the recollection of general timings and distances), they were disregarded. In cases where discrepancies were more significant or starkly deviated from the prevailing narrative, they were noted and assessed further in the context of other evidence to see if they could be reconciled. If reconciliation with the prevailing narrative was not possible, the discrepant narrative could be considered limited in value and therefore difficult to objectively address the FFM's mandate aims.
5.8 The information and services provided to the FFM by the authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic are listed in this report under Annexes 2 and 5. The FFM reviewed the information provided in order to gather facts regarding the incident involving the alleged use of toxic chemicals.
Analysis of the incident in the Al-Awamid area of Aleppo on 2 August 2016
5.9 The prevailing narrative established by a review of all of the interviews relating to this reported incident is as follows:
(a) The information provided by the testimonies of those interviewed is that some form of combat operation was ongoing in the Al-Awamid area of Aleppo (Al-Hamam Point in the Al-Aqaba area). Soldiers of the Syrian Arab Army (SAAR) were engaged in a battle, which reportedly had begun two to three days before 2 August 2016, with members of an armed opposition group.
(b) Between 16:00 and 17:00 on 1 August 2016, SAAR soldiers were alerted to the presence of a tunnel, which was approximately 25 metres long and 7 metres deep. The armed opposition group attempted to blow up the tunnel, but it appears that only a small section collapsed.
(c) At 21:00 on 1 August 2016, SAAR soldiers were ordered to destroy the remaining sections of the tunnel, as it could still be used by armed opposition groups. SAAR soldiers dug several metres into the tunnel in order to set the explosive charges. They used six explosive cylinders which had been seized from armed opposition groups, or unexploded devices which had been fired at SAAR positions. These cylinders had been described as "hell cannons" or mortars, which comprised a gas cylinder (approximately 25 kg in weight and 1 metre in length) with a detonator.
(d) Prior to the initiation of the main charges by the SAAR, soldiers were dispatched to inspect a portion of the tunnel. It appears that the soldiers were able to enter and return from this inspection with no ill effects. The SAAR detonated the main charges at approximately 4:00 on 2 August 2016.
(e) The SAAR waited until between 11:30 and 12:00 on 2 August 2016 before sending two soldiers into the tunnel to ensure that the desired effect had been achieved and that the tunnel could no longer be used by armed opposition group forces. It appears that the soldiers entered the tunnel without any respiratory protection and did not return to the surface when called. While these soldiers were in the tunnel, another soldier, stationed in the area near the opening of the tunnel, described a strange, strong odour coming up from the tunnel.
(f) A decision was made to send an additional two soldiers with masks and canisters into the tunnel, and these soldiers also did not reply to calls. A total of four soldiers were now down in the tunnel and not responding to calls.
(g) Rescue operations then commenced with the assistance of the Syrian Civil Defence and firefighters. The first person from the Civil Defence entered the tunnel equipped with a self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and two ropes to assist in bringing the victims out. Within one minute of entering the tunnel, both ropes went slack and there was no response to verbal calls. There were now five individuals in the tunnel.
(h) Firefighters then arrived and were briefed on the ongoing situation. A firefighter entered the tunnel equipped with an SCBA and two ropes to attempt a rescue. A minute to a minute and a half after entering the tunnel, this firefighter failed to respond to verbal calls and both ropes appeared to be unattached. There were now six individuals in the tunnel.
(i) It is assessed that these individuals were unconscious at that point, and were presumed to have become fatalities. When they entered into the tunnel, the first two victims had no respiratory protection, the second two wore facemasks and canisters, and the last two were equipped with SCBAs, the cylinders of which were reportedly filled with oxygen.
(j) At this point of the operation, four oxygen cylinders were lowered into the tunnel one at a time, in an attempt to increase oxygen levels. Water was also sprayed into the mouth of the tunnel.
(k) Between 15:30 and 16:00, a third rescuer, a member of the Civil Defence, entered the tunnel again equipped with an SCBA and two ropes. While being lowered into the tunnel, he complained of dizziness and tightness in his chest, and was then pulled out. After a short rest, he was again lowered into the tunnel. When he reached the bottom of the tunnel, he indicated to be taken out of the tunnel. Upon extraction, he reported there was no strength in his hands; he was given water and then collapsed. Afterwards, he was transported to Al-Razi Hospital for treatment.
(l) A fourth rescuer, a member of the Civil Defence, entered the tunnel, again equipped with an SCBA and two ropes. He attached the rope to a victim; he was then extracted, followed by the victim. This victim was still wearing his SCBA and appeared to be unresponsive.
(m) A firefighter, who was part of a rescue team but did not enter into the tunnel, began performing mouth-to-mouth resuscitation, while another firefighter attempted chest compressions on a rescued victim. One of these firefighters started to feel tightness in his chest and developed a headache, and dizziness. It was reported that "a strange smell was coming off the casualty, and a heat was radiating out of him". The rescuer who was performing the resuscitation touched his own face with his hands (which had been holding the casualty) and his face and hands started to burn and itch.
(n) The fourth rescuer, who was involved in the retrieval of four casualties from the tunnel, reports that he collapsed, short of breath, and his verbal response was not normal. He was sent to the Al-Razi Hospital for further treatment.
(o) A fifth rescuer, a firefighter, entered the tunnel and attached the rope to the fifth casualty, who was reported to have been wearing a face mask with a filter. This firefighter repeated the same process for the sixth casualty; as he was tying up the last casualty, he started to get a headache and experienced shortness of breath. This rescuer then collapsed while walking to the ladder at the base of the tunnel, and he too was retrieved by the attached rope and sent to the Al-Razi Hospital.
(p) None of those interviewed could describe the smell, except to say that it was a strange, weird, or strong smell that they had never experienced before and could not identify. The smell increased closer to the entrance of the tunnel and when the oxygen cylinders were lowered into the tunnel. A particularly strong smell came off the bodies of the casualties when they were retrieved from the tunnel. It was not a gunpowder or explosive smell that any of the interview participants had experienced before.
(q) Throughout the whole incident, there was ongoing intense fighting, including with a number of mortars and projectiles landing in close proximity to the tunnel. This fighting hindered and prolonged the rescue operation.
(r) Many of the interviewees had difficulty identifying the exact incident location on a map. However, there was consistency in that the interviewees could identify local landmarks, which were corroborated by the Syrian Arab Republic National Authority's reporting of the GPS coordinates of the incident location.
(s) As previously described, captured enemy "hell cannon mortars" were used to assist in demolishing the tunnel. The actual content of these munitions is unknown.
Discrepancies
5.10 Some soldiers stated they could smell the odour with face masks/filters on, while others could not smell anything.
5.11 The exact timeline of the incident is not entirely clear. It was reported that there was a "fierce battle raging" for several days with intense shelling of the area. What is clear is that, at some point, the tunnel was discovered and an attempt was made to destroy it. There is no clear indication of what was in or around the tunnel prior to the attempt to destroy it.
Hospital phase of the alleged event
5.12 Between 16:00 and 16:30 on 2 August 2016, the first patient arrived, closely followed by additional casualties with similar symptoms: e.g., headache, dizziness, shortness of breath, dry mouth, and itchy skin. The last case arrived at approximately 19:00 on 2 August 2016. In total, 20 patients were treated.
5.13 It appears that not all of the patients entered the tunnel; some had been outside.
5.14 All patients were stripped of their clothes, washed with soap and water, and dressed in hospital gowns. The majority of the patients were washed in the emergency department prior to going to the ward for further treatment.
5.15 Acetylcholinesterase (AChE) levels for some of the patients were checked to rule out the use of sarin. They also received atropine injections due to the agitation and constricted pupils, but when the blood results returned within normal limits, these tests were ceased.
5.16 Overall, oxygen saturations, blood pressure, and pulse readings were normal, as were all blood results (AChE, complete blood count, glucose, urea, and creatinine). Chest X-rays were also conducted on some patients and appeared normal.
5.17 No smell or any visual signs of skin irritation were noted, despite the patients complaining of itchiness.
5.18 The patients displaying altered consciousness generally woke up within four to five hours after arriving to the hospital, and were complaining of dizziness and headache. Prior to loss of consciousness, these patients complained of headache, dizziness, dry mouth, burning sensation, limb fatigue, nausea, vomiting, and overall varied symptoms. No patients were admitted to the intensive care unit or required intubation.
5.19 The medical staffs involved in the treatment were unable to identify any toxic substance that may have affected the patients.
5.20 The clothing from three of the casualties was stored in the director's office and handed over to the National Authority representatives on 28 August 2016, when they visited the hospital. The team was later granted access to the clothing for sampling purposes.
Described symptoms and treatment
5.21 In general, all patients were decontaminated with soap and water.
5.22 In some cases, intravenous access was gained with oxygen, saline fluids, and symptomatic drugs being administered on a case-by-case basis.
5.23 Some patients were prescribed antibiotics to prevent pneumonia, ranitidine for stomach complaints, and salbutamol inhalers for respiratory relief.
5.24 Despite normal oxygen saturations readings prior, it appears that shortness of breath or tightness in the chest was resolved with oxygen and salbutamol treatment where indicated.
5.25 Unconscious patients were monitored closely, but no definitive airway treatment was required.
5.26 Many patients were discharged either on the same day or within one to two days. The longest hospital stay was three days. Many patients continued with symptomatic medications for one to two weeks following the event.
5.27 Some patients were still complaining of symptoms (fatigue, shortness of breath, bitter taste in mouth, thirst, and headache) at the time of the interviews in October 2016.
Discrepancies
5.28 Some patients had no ongoing symptoms, while others complained of fatigue or had headaches, dry mouth, or were thirsty for weeks following the alleged event.
5.29 There was no specific pattern in the presentation of signs and symptoms in the patients. Some were confused and highly agitated, while others were calm. Other signs and symptoms included: altered consciousness, conjunctivitis, headache, irritated airways, shortness of breath or a feeling of suffocation, fatigue, dizziness, dry mouth, and burning sensation or itchiness of the skin, along with red eyes and red skin.
Sampling committee phase of the alleged event
5.30 A group comprised of three National Authority representatives was tasked with travelling to Aleppo between 27 and 29 August 2016 to conduct a preliminary investigation into the incident. This included travelling to the site, collecting samples, interviewing individuals connected with the incident, and collecting applicable medical data.
5.31 The committee travelled to the impact site and Al-Razi Hospital and interviewed soldiers, Civil Defence members, firefighters, and medical staff who were directly involved in the incident. They were handed samples that were reported to have come from the deceased, the patients, and the soil from the site (this soil was taken from the surface above the tunnel, as the latter was no longer accessible).
5.32 The chemical specialist in the group tested the samples for traces of chemical agents, chlorine, carbon monoxide/dioxide, nitrogen monoxide/dioxide, phosgene, hydrogen sulfide, hydrogen cyanide, cyanogen chloride, ammonia, and amines. The specialist could only report that there were increased ammonia readings on the tested clothing from the hospital (3 to 6 parts per million).
Discrepancies
5.33 There was a small variance in dates and times reported by the National Authority committee members; overall, however, their narratives were consistent.
Scientific Studies and Research Centre phase of the alleged event
5.34 The laboratory conducted a preliminary screening of the samples for mustard, cyanide, phosgene, chlorine, carbon monoxide, and nerve agents. A Drager XAM 7000 device and colorimetric tubes were used for the screening of the above-mentioned substances. In addition, gas chromatography-mass spectrometry (GC-MS) and Fourier transform infrared spectroscopy (FTIR) were used to analyse the samples. Several compounds were identified in the samples, but no final conclusion was reached.
5.35 It was reported that the analytical chemistry laboratory at the SSRC is not specialised in the analysis of Chemical Weapons Convention-related substances.
Discrepancies
5.36 The laboratory equipment used to conduct the analyses is lacking calibration and maintenance logs.
Analysis of information provided to the Fact-Finding Mission in the form of documents and services
5.37 The information and services provided by the National Authority of the Syrian Arab Republic assisted the FFM in clarifying the following:
(a) the document entitled "Report on Poisoning with Toxic Gases on 02/08/2016", which offered a brief description of the alleged incident that took place on 2 August 2016, in Aleppo (referred to in Letter No. 122, dated 15 August 2016). This document provides an overview of the incident, as well as information regarding the location of the incident, the name of an armed opposition group reported to have been involved in the incident, photos of the location, images of some of the deceased persons, and the names of the casualties and patients. The document also describes the rescue operation, the hospital treatment, the type of blood samples, and casualty signs and symptoms;
(b) several samples were collected by the National Authority committee but not all were analysed. The results of those that had been analysed were provided to the FFM;
(c) images from Google Earth were also provided by the National Authority of the Syrian Arab Republic detailing the location related to the reported incident in Aleppo on 2 August 2016; and
(d) the National Authority provided the FFM with medical records of patients treated at Al-Razi Hospital.
6.1 While the prevailing narrative provided by the testimonies of those interviewed describes some form of ongoing combat operations in the Al-Awamid area of Aleppo (Al-Hamam Point in Al-Aqaba area), the FFM is of the view that those affected in the alleged incident may have, in some instances, been exposed to some type of non-persistent, irritating substance.
6.2 However, the FFM considers that while the general clinical presentation of those affected in the incident is consistent with brief exposure to any number of chemicals or environmental insults, the visual and olfactory description of the potential irritant does not clearly indicate any specific chemical.
6.3 Based on the evidence presented by the National Authority of the Syrian Arab Republic, the medical records that were reviewed, the results of the sample analyses, and the prevailing narrative of all of the interviews, the FFM cannot confidently determine whether or not a specific chemical was used as a weapon in the investigated incident. From the results of the analyses of the samples, the FFM is of the opinion that none of the chemicals identified are likely to be the cause of death of the casualties in the reported incident.
7. FACT-FINDING MISSION MANDATED AIMS
7.1 Gather facts regarding the incident of alleged use of toxic chemicals as a weapon, as detailed in Letter No. 122 from the Syrian Arab Republic (dated 15 August 2016), mindful that the task of the FFM does not include the question of attributing responsibility for the alleged use.
7.2 Report to the Director-General upon conclusion of FFM activities.
8.1 Review and analyse all available information pertaining to the reported incident of alleged use of toxic chemicals as a weapon.
8.2 Collect testimonies from persons alleged to have been affected by the use of toxic chemicals as a weapon, including those who underwent treatment, eyewitnesses of the alleged use of toxic chemicals, medical personnel, and other persons who had treated or come into contact with persons who may have been affected by the alleged use of toxic chemicals, as detailed in Letter No. 122 from the Syrian Arab Republic (dated 15 August 2016).
8.3 If possible, and where safe to do so, visit the hospitals and other locations as deemed relevant to the conduct of its investigations.
8.4 Examine and, if possible, collect copies of the hospital records, including patient registers, treatment records, and any other relevant records, as deemed necessary.
8.5 Examine and, if possible, collect copies of any other documentation and records deemed necessary.
8.6 Take photographs and examine and, if possible, collect copies of video and telephone records.
8.7 Recover the samples held on behalf of the FFM at the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) in Barzi, Damascus.
8.8 If possible, and deemed necessary, physically examine and take samples from remnants of cylinders, containers, etc. alleged to have been used during the incident under investigation.
8.9 If possible, and deemed necessary, collect environmental samples at the alleged point of the incident and surrounding areas.
8.10 Provide the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic with a duplicate or a portion of each environmental sample, if any, and, to the extent possible, a duplicate or portion of each of the biomedical samples collected in the course of the mission.
8.11 Cooperate fully with the relevant Syrian authorities with regard to all aspects of the mission.
8.12 Conduct all activities of the FFM in accordance with the relevant procedures of the Secretariat relating to the conduct of inspections during contingency operations, as applicable.
This Fact-Finding Mission report was submitted on 20 December 2016 in English.
[Signed]
Steven Wallis
Mission Leader
LIST OF CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE NATIONAL AUTHORITY OF THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC
Name DCN Date Info Letter No. 122 SAR #0185197 15/08/2016 Correspondence regarding toxic gas attack NL 69 SAR #0156350 16/08/2016 Correspondence regarding toxic gas attack Letter to SAR, L/ODG/205745/16 #6568/023 30/08/2016 Advance team deployment NV/ODG/206055/16 #6568/024 19/09/2016 Request to provide more information about alleged incident on 06/09/16 Letter to SAR, L/ODG/206193/16 #66568/025 26/09/2016 FFM main body deployment SAR NV 96 #0125532 02/11/2016 Response to L/ODG/CDB/206391/16 NV/ODG/206802/16 #6597/059 03/11/2016 Request to provide more information about alleged incidents SAR NV 106 #0125539 16/11/2016 Response to L/ODG/HP/206055/16
LIST OF INFORMATION RECEIVED/HANDED OVER DURING DEPLOYMENTS
First Deployment No. DCM Description Date Received/Handed Over 1. 6568/012 SD card - copies of photos from sampling 07/09/2016 Handed over 2. 6568/013 List of the seals applied on the samples 07/09/2016 Handed over 3. 6568/014 Copies of 20 medical records 07/09/2016 Received 4. 6568/015 Preliminary laboratory results of analysis 07/09/2016 Received 5. 6568/016 Report on poisoning with toxic gases on 02/08/16 07/09/2016 Received 6. 6568/017 Package of documents Aleppo 02/08/16 07/09/2016 Received 7. 6568/018 X-ray images 07/09/2016 Received 8. 6568/019 Package - CD with photos and lab results 07/09/2016 Received Second Deployment No. DCM Description Date Received/Handed Over 1. 6597/012 Comparative list of names in English 12/10/2016 Handed over 2. 6597/013 Comparative list of names in Arabic 12/10/2016 Handed over 3. 6597/037 List of medical staff to be interviewed 12/10/2016 Handed over 4. 6597/038 List of interviewees 12/10/2016 Handed over 5. 6597/043 20 medical records - original 16/10/2016 Received 6. 6597/044 Copy of 1 medical record 16/10/2016 Received 7. 6597/046 List of seals - samples in joint custody 17/10/2016 Handed over 8. 6597/047 List of seals - samples for off-site analysis 17/10/2016 Handed over 9. 6597/049 SD card - copies of photos of samples packing 18/10/2016 Handed over
LIST OF INTERVIEWEES FROM THE SECOND DEPLOYMENT
DCN Profession Date of interview DCN Profession Date of interview 10000 Soldier 13/10/2016 10038 Civil Defence member 15/10/2016 10001 Civil Defence member 13/10/2016 10043 Resident doctor 14/10/2016 10002 Firefighter 13/10/2016 10045 Nurse 14/10/2016 10003 Firefighter 13/10/2016 10046 Civil Defence member 15/10/2016 10004 Soldier 13/10/2016 10047 Doctor, toxicologist 14/10/2016 10005 Civil Defence member 13/10/2016 10048 Emergency department doctor 14/10/2016 10006 Firefighter 13/10/2016 10049 Nurse 14/10/2016 10013 Lab staff 17/10/2016 10051 Internal medicine doctor 14/10/2016 10032 Firefighter 15/10/2016 10052 Firefighter 15/10/2016 10034 Firefighter 15/10/2016 10041 Chemist 18/10/2016 10035 Firefighter 15/10/2016 10040 Senior officer, Syrian Arab Army 18/10/2016 10036 Firefighter 15/10/2016 10044 Senior staff member, SSRC 18/10/2016 10037 Senior firefighter 15/10/2016
MAPPING OF INCIDENT LOCATION
Click to enlarge
LIST OF SAMPLES
No. Sample Code Description 1. SD06S Unheated carbon from canister 2. SD07S Heated carbon from canister 3. SD13B Canister (blank) 4. SD08S Filter content - metal oxide 5. SD09S Filter content - mixed carbon/metal oxide 6. SL04S Soil sample 7. SL05S Soil sample 8. SD01S Textile sample (black) 9. SD02S Textile sample (black/green) 10. SD03S Textile sample (orange hi vis) 11. WP11S Wipe sample from filter 12. WP12S Wipe from respirator face piece 13. WP10B Cotton and DCM (blank) 14. WP10S Wipe from O cylinder
SELECT SAMPLE PHOTOGRAPHS
Samples as initially received during first deployment:
Post-packaging for storage
Second deployment: Samples repackaged for transport to OPCW Laboratory
LIST OF MATERIAL GATHERED DURING THE INTERVIEW PROCESS
Entry ERN DCN Interviewee Name / Code Evidence Description Evidence Collected/Received When (Date and Time) Where 1. 201610141004701 10047 10047 1 x MSD
Audio Recording14/10/2016 16:30 Damascus 2. 201610141004702 10047 10047 1 x SD Card
Video Recording14/10/2016 16:30 Damascus 3. 201610141004301 10043 10043 1 x MSD
Audio recording14/10/2016 16:30 Damascus 4. 201610141004302 10043 10043 1 x SD Card
Video Recording14/10/2016 16:30 Damascus 5. 201610141004901 10049 10049 1 x MSD
Audio Recording14/10/2016 16:35 Damascus 6. 201610141004902 10049 10049 1 x SD Card
Video Recording14/10/2016 16:35 Damascus 7. 201610131000401 10004 10004 1 x MSD
Audio Recording14/10/2016 16:45 Damascus 8. 201610131000402 10004 10004 1 x SD Card
Video Recording14/10/2016 16:45 Damascus 9. 201610131000403 10004 10004 Drawing 1 page 14/10/2016 16:46 Damascus 10. 201610131000501 10005 10005 1 x MSD
Audio Recording14/10/2016 17:05 Damascus 11. 201610131000502 10005 10005 1 x SD Card
Video Recording14/10/2016 17:05 Damascus 12. 201610131000503 10005 10005 Drawing 1 page 14/10/2016 17:05 Damascus 13. 201610131000601 10006 10006 3 x MSD
Audio Recording14/10/2016 17:10 Damascus 14. 201610131000602 10006 10006 1 x SD Card
Video Recording14/10/2016 17:10 Damascus 15. 201610131000101 10001 10001 1 x MSD
Audio Recording14/10/2016 17:15 Damascus 16. 201610131000102 10001 10001 1 x SD Card
Video Recording14/10/2016 17:15 Damascus 17. 201610131000001 10000 10000 1 x SD Card
Video Recording14/10/2016 17:20 Damascus 18. 201610131000002 10000 10000 1 x MSD
Audio Recording14/10/2016 17:20 Damascus 19. 201610131000201 10002 10002 1 x SD Card
Video Recording14/10/2016 17:20 Damascus 20. 201610131000202 10002 10002 1 x MSD
Audio Recording14/10/2016 17:20 Damascus 21. 201610131000301 10003 10003 1 x SD Card
Video Recording14/10/2016 17:30 Damascus 22. 201610131000302 10003 10003 1 x MSD
Audio Recording14/10/2016 17:30 Damascus 23. 201610141004501 10045 10045 1 x MSD
Audio Recording14/10/2016 17:30 Damascus 24. 201610141004502 10045 10045 1 x SD Card
Video Recording14/10/2016 17:30 Damascus 25. 201610141004801 10048 10048 1 x MSD
Audio Recording14/10/2016 17:40 Damascus 26. 201610141004802 10048 10048 1 x SD Card
Video Recording14/10/2016 17:40 Damascus 27. 201610141005101 10051 10051 1 x MSD
Audio Recording14/10/2016 17:50 Damascus 28. 201610141005102 10051 10051 1 x SD Card
Video Recording14/10/2016 17:50 Damascus 29. 201610151003801 10038 10038 1 x SD Card
Video Recording15/10/2016 20:00 Damascus 30. 201610151003802 10038 10038 1 x MSD
Audio Recording15/10/2016 20:00 Damascus 31. 201610151004601 10046 10046 1 x SD Card
Video Recording15/10/2016 20:30 Damascus 32. 201610151004602 10046 10046 1 x MSD
Audio Recording15/10/2016 20:30 Damascus 33. 201610151004603 10046 10046 1 x Drawing 15/10/2016 20:30 Damascus 34. 201610151003201 10032 10032 1 x SD Card
Video Recording15/10/2016 20:30 Damascus 35. 201610151003202 10032 10032 1 x MSD
Audio Recording15/10/2016 20:30 Damascus 36. 201610151005201 10052 10052 1 x SD Card
Video Recording15/10/2016 20:30 Damascus 37. 201610151005202 10052 10052 1 x MSD
Audio Recording15/10/2016 20:30 Damascus 38. 201610151003601 10036 10036 1 x MSD
Audio Recording15/10/2016 20:15 Damascus 39. 201610151003602 10036 10036 1 x SD Card
Video Recording15/10/2016 20:15 Damascus 40. 201610151003603 10036 10036 1 x Map 15/10/2016 20:15 Damascus 41. 201610151003501 10035 10035 1 x MSD
Audio Recording15/10/2016 20:20 Damascus 42. 201610151003502 10035 10035 1 x SD Card
Video Recording15/10/2016 20:20 Damascus 43. 201610151003401 10034 10034 1 x MSD
Audio Recording15/10/2016 20:25 Damascus 44. 201610151003402 10034 10034 1 x SD Card
Video Recording15/10/2016 20:25 Damascus 45. 201610151003701 10037 10037 1 x MSD
Audio Recording15/10/2016 20:00 Damascus 46. 201610151003702 10037 10037 1 x SD Card
Video Recording15/10/2016 20:00 Damascus 47. 201610171001301 10013 10013 1 x MSD
Audio Recording17/10/2016 17:00 Damascus 48. 201610171001302 10013 10013 1 x MSD
Audio Recording17/10/2016 17:00 Damascus 49. 201610171001303 10013 10013 1 x SD Photos 17/10/2016 17:00 Damascus
RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS OF SAMPLES RECEIVED FROM FFM/007/16 CONDUCTED AT THE OPCW LABORATORY
1 December 2016
Executive summary
1. As requested by FFM/007/16 and as approved by the Director-General on 4 November 2016 (the approval of the request is included in Memorandum M/VER/LAB/206849/16), the OPCW Laboratory conducted an analysis of the environmental samples received from the Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) team.
2. The scope of the analysis included scheduled chemicals, precursors, and degradation products. The analysis also aimed to gain a deeper understanding of the characteristics of the samples.
3. A total of 14 samples were received (including blanks), of which 13 were analysed (see main text for an explanation).
4. Only textile sample SD02S contained reportable chemicals or chemicals of interest for the purpose of the analysis.
5. Methyl diethanolamine (MDEA, Schedule 3.B.16), a precursor for nitrogen mustard, was identified in sample SD02S. This chemical is also found in commercial products such as certain detergents.
6. In addition, both benzylchloride and benzylbromide were found in sample SD02S. Both of these chemicals are strong irritants (lachrymators) and were used not only for that purpose as a warfare agent in World War 1, but also for training purposes due to their non-lethal nature. Exposure of casualties to these chemicals in larger amounts should have resulted in extensive eye irritation and watering eyes.
7. None of the chemicals found can serve as an explanation for the rapid death of victims in the related incident.
8. An analysis of a protective mask filter was inconclusive, as the provided blank filter turned out to be of a different type than the filter worn by one of the fatalities. This makes it impossible to rule out the chemicals used for impregnation of the filter.
Initial situation
9. FFM team FFM/007/16 handed over samples to the OPCW Laboratory on 1 November 2016 and provided background information on the samples. The team requested an analysis focusing on the presence of scheduled chemicals, precursors, and degradation products. This request was made in document FFM/001/16/6597/005.
10. The OPCW Laboratory submitted Memorandum M/VER/LAB/206849/16 to the Director-General, recommending that an analysis of the samples be conducted at the OPCW Laboratory as requested by the team. The Director-General approved this request on 4 November 2016.
11. It is noted that no full chain of custody exists for the samples in question prior to the moment of receipt by the team. Information received from the team does not point to a specific toxic chemical or group of toxic chemicals responsible for the fatalities in the investigated incident.
12. No autopsy of fatalities was conducted and no biomedical samples are available. Based on available data, a targeted analysis was not possible.
Analysis results
13. The 14 samples received include activated carbon from a mask canister, powder (indicated as metal oxide) from a mask filter, soil textiles, and extracts from wipe samples. The samples include blanks. An intact and unused mask filter was provided to serve as a blank comparison for the charcoal from the filter of one of the fatalities. One of the samples was a slip of the charcoal from the mask filter that was heated in some previous experiments. As this sample was of less value than the unheated charcoal, no analysis was conducted on this sample (SD07S).
14. Chemicals of interest were only found in sample textile SD02S. (Methyl diethanolamine was identified by GC-MS(EI) as its TMS and TBDMS derivative, benzylbromide and benzylchloride were identified by GC-MS(EI) underivatised).
Chemical name Structure Sample code Comments Methyl diethanolamine SD02S Nitrogen mustard precursor, Schedule 3.B.16 Benzylbromide SD02S Lachrymator and irritant, not scheduled Benzylchloride SD02S Lachrymator and irritant, not scheduled Problems with the mask filter "blank"
15. An unused mask filter was provided (SD13B) as a "blank". The filter was opened and the activated charcoal from the filter was removed to serve as blank material. Charcoal used in such filters are impregnated with certain chemicals and the use of a blank would enable an analyst to differentiate between a chemical that was already on the charcoal from production, and one that had been deposited on the charcoal by the inhalation of contaminated air.
16. A visual inspection of both the charcoal from the blank SD13B as a well as the charcoal from sample SD06S revealed a different physical appearance (see photo below). Photos made available by the team then also revealed that the filters were not of identical make, but instead showed a somewhat different shape. Therefore, the above-mentioned comparison could not be conducted.
17. Thermal desorption of sample SD06S yielded a peak with prominent mask peaks at m/z 45 and m/z 60 (molecular ion). This is indicative of acetic acid. Only ions with m/z > 44 were recorded (to exclude the dominant influence of CO2). However, extracts of the same charcoal with polar and non-polar solvents did not confirm the presence of acetic acid.
Different appearance of charcoal from "blank" sample SD13B (left in both photos) and "real" sample SD06S (right in both pictures)
Conclusions
18. None of the identified chemicals are likely to be the cause of death of the fatalities in the incident. Methyl diethanolamine is a nitrogen mustard precursor, but is also found in commercial detergents. Signs of nitrogen mustard exposure were not apparent in the casualties.
19. The identified lachrymators and irritants benzylbromide and benzychloride are strongly harassing chemicals even at low concentrations. They are generally considered non-lethal and would--due to their irritating nature--trigger a strong urge to escape the exposure. As they are strong lachrymators, one would expect strong eye irritation and watery eyes. However, the presence of these chemicals at low concentration might explain the short-term skin and lung irritation reported by other witnesses of the incident.
Annex II
I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the note by the Technical Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons entitled "Summary update of the activities carried out by the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria in 2016" (see enclosure).
(Signed) Ahmet Üzümcü
Enclosure
OPCW
Technical SecretariatS/1445/2016
27 December 2016
Original: ENGLISHNOTE BY THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT
SUMMARY UPDATE OF THE ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT BY THE OPCW FACT-FINDING MISSION IN SYRIA IN 2016INTRODUCTION
1. In accordance with Executive Council decisions EC-M-48/DEC.1 (dated 4 February 2015) and EC-M-50/DEC.1 (dated 23 November 2015), as well as by United Nations Security Council resolution 2209 (2015), the Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) has continued to study all available information relating to allegations of use of chemical weapons in Syria, including that provided by the Syrian Arab Republic as well as by others.
2. This summary provides an update on the Fact-Finding Mission's activities in 2016 in accordance with the aforementioned Executive Council decisions, as well as United Nations Security Council resolution 2209 (2015).
METHODOLOGY RELATED TO THE COLLECTION AND EVALUATION OF INFORMATION
3. As recommended by the Executive Council, the FFM has collected and studied all available information related to allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. This includes information provided in notes verbales by the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as other sources.
4. For each allegation of use, the FFM conducts an initial evaluation of the incident based on all available information. Each incident is then categorised using the following criteria:
(a) High: There is significant information consistent with the use of chemicals as weapons.
(b) Medium: There is some information lending credence to the possibility of the use of chemicals, but it is currently insufficient to make a confident assessment of consistency with the use of chemicals as weapons.
(c) Low: There is no or little available information, or the information available suggests a low likelihood of the use of chemicals as weapons.
5. Initial assessments may alter over time as more information becomes available.
6. The FFM applies a number of methods of evaluation, including, but not limited to:
(a) research into the incidents and existing reports;
(b) assessment and corroboration of background information;
(c) meetings or interviews with potential witnesses, either in person or using remote technology;
(d) review of documentation and records provided by interviewees;
(e) review of photographs, video, and audio material;
(f) assessment of the symptoms of casualties as reported by interviewees.
7. In order to gather facts regarding incidents of alleged use of chemicals as weapons, the FFM has deployed several times throughout the year in order to conduct interviews and collect additional evidence, including samples.
8. Further investigation may be carried out for allegations categorised as medium-high.
OVERVIEW OF INFORMATION REVIEWED
Notes Verbales from the Syrian Arab Republic
9. The Technical Secretariat has received 46 notes verbales from the Syrian Arab Republic (classified as Protected) between January 2016 and 20 November 2016, which contain information that is potentially relevant to the use of chemicals as weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. These are listed in Annex 1.
10. Two of these notes verbales requested the FFM to investigate specific incidents of the possible use of chemicals as weapons. The remaining 44 notes verbales conveyed information relating to alleged perpetrators, including potential supply routes and storage locations. Eight of these 44 notes verbales also referenced allegations of the use of chemicals as weapons. The FFM has requested the Syrian Arab Republic to provide additional supporting information, such as intelligence reports or documentation, to substantiate this information and to facilitate the assessment process.
Other sources
11. From December 2015 to 20 November 2016, the FFM recorded 65 potential incidents of the use of chemical weapons reported in open sources. These are listed in Annex 2.
12. The FFM has actively pursued further information, including information provided by States Parties, the United Nations (including the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) in Damascus), non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and potential witnesses, as well as in-depth research on the Internet.
FACT-FINDING ACTIVITIES
13. As noted above, the FFM has deployed on several occasions in order to gather relevant facts. All deployments and movement of the FFM took place with all necessary authorisations, including authorisation from the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS).
Information provided by the Syrian Arab Republic
14. With respect to the investigation requested by the Syrian Arab Republic in its note verbale number 69, the FFM conducted two visits to Damascus. During the initial deployment, the advance team discussed the future conduct of the mission. During this deployment, the FFM attended a number of meetings with the National Authority and was provided with:
(a) a briefing on the incident that occurred in the area of Al Awamid in Aleppo on 2 August 2016;
(b) a written report regarding the incident;
(c) a package of documents that included patient medical records and x-ray images of casualties admitted to the hospital as a result of the incident;
(d) a medical report on the cause of death of one of the fatalities;
(e) preliminary laboratory results concerning a number of samples that the National Authority had retrieved from the site of the incident; and
(f) access to the Syrian Scientific and Research Centre (SSRC) in Barzeh to secure the samples mentioned in (e) above.
15. During the second deployment, the FFM conducted interviews and recovered 14 samples from the SSRC in Barzeh for onward transport to the OPCW Laboratory at Rijswijk, The Hague.
16. Interviews were carried out with the following persons:
(a) 13 casualties;
(b) 8 medical staff involved in the treatment of the casualties;
(c) 1 member of staff involved in the receipt of the samples mentioned in paragraph 13 (e) above; and
(d) 3 members of the National Authority committee that retrieved the samples.
17. Samples consisted of:
(a) soil;
(b) clothing;
(c) a canister and wipe samples from a mask; and
(d) an oxygen cylinder.
18. A report has been issued regarding the alleged incident on 2 August 2016 in Al Awamid, Aleppo.
19. At the time of writing this report, a deployment of the FFM to the Syrian Arab Republic took place as per the request of the Syrian Arab Republic in note verbale number 109, dated 17 November 2016. The team is currently translating and analysing the interview recordings and associated documentation, and is awaiting analysis of the samples that were transferred to the OPCW Laboratory.
20. Further samples have been left, under seal, in the Syrian Arab Republic.
Information provided by other sources
21. In six alleged incidents, the FFM conducted 13 remote audio interviews and two in-person interviews.
22. The information provided through these interviews will require further substantiation and corroborating evidence in order for the FFM to make factual findings on the alleged incidents.
23. The lack of access to witnesses and supporting evidence continues to present challenges for further required investigation.
NEXT STEPS
24. The next phase of the FFM's work will concentrate on building upon its analysis of available evidence through the continued collection and evaluation of relevant information and evidence through all means available.
25. The FFM will provide more detailed reports in due course, including information on all relevant methodology.
Annexes: English only
Annex 1: Notes Verbales Received from the Syrian Arab Republic in 2016 (up to 20 November) with Potential Relevance to the Use of Chemicals as Weapons
Annex 2: Open source Allegations of the Use of Chemicals as Weapons, from 1 December 2015 to 21 November 2016
NOTES VERBALES RECEIVED FROM THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC IN 2016 (UP TO 20 NOVEMBER)
WITH POTENTIAL RELEVANCE TO THE ALLEGED SUPPLY, STORAGE AND USE OF CHEMICALS AS WEAPONS
Date of NV No. Transmission of information (TI) or request for action (RA) Summary 1. 5 January 4 TI Supply of toxic chemicals 2. 15 January 8 TI Supply of toxic chemical 3. 1 February 12 TI Targeting of areas with chemicals in an attempt to mislead. 4. 2 February 13 TI Supply of chemicals 5. 5 February 16 TI Acquisition and development of missiles . 6. 5 February 17 TI Smuggling of chemicals 7. 8 February 19 TI Reference to a chemical attack at an airport on 2 February 2016 8. 8 February 20 TI Reference to a chemical attack on 19 March 2013 9. 15 February 22 TI Supply of toxic gas and intention to use 10. 30 March 34 TI Supply of chemicals and storage location 11. 19 April 39 TI Information regarding attack (Tanaf) 12. 04 May 40 TI Supply of chemicals and storage location 13. 06 May 42 TI Supply of chemicals and distribution of masks 14. 11 May 43 TI Transport and storage of toxic chemicals. 15. 06 June 48 TI Smuggling of chemicals from neighbouring country 16. 17 Jun 54 TI Chemical attack on 13 June 2016 17. 07 July 58 TI Request for answers from a neighbouring country 18. 11 July 59 TI Storage locations 19. 11 July 60 TI Targeting of Sheikh Maqsoud 08 March and 07 April 2016 20. 12 July 62 TI Activities in the area of Sheikh Bahr in Idlib 21. 14 July 64 TI Activity related to toxic chemicals 22. 16 August 69 RA Attaches letter 122 which contains information on Al-Awamid and requests investigation by FFM. 23. 17 August 70 TI Filling of CW 24. 26 September 76 TI Storage of nitrate and napalm 25. 29 September 77 TI Intention to use toxic chemicals 26. 03 October 78 TI Coordination of use of CW 27. 05 October 79 TI Information on attack on Um Hoosh 28. 05 October 80 TI Intention to use and storage location 29. 10 October 82 TI Storage of toxic chemicals and their potential use 30. 10 October 83 TI Theft and moving of toxic chemicals 31. 10 October 84 TI Smuggling and transport of toxic chemicals 32. 18 October 88 TI Stockpiling of toxic chemicals 33. 19 October 89 TI Location of CW supplied from neighbouring country 34. 1 November 90 TI Supply of CW to terrorists by neighbouring country 35. 1 November 92 TI Intention of transportation of toxic chemicals by terrorists 36. 1 November 93 TI Possession and location of CW by terrorists 37. 1 November 94 TI Intention of terrorist organisation to attack civilians and fabricate evidence 38. 1 November 95 TI Transport of CW from neighbouring country 39. 02 November 96 TI Document classification 40. 04 November 97 TI Export of CW 41. 04 November 98 TI Preparation of CW by terrorist organisation 42. 10 November 101 TI Preparation for targeting of military forces and civilians with toxic chemicals. 43. 14 November 105 TI Attack on 03 November 44. 16 November 106 TI Including CD, claims fabricated footage and explains why invalid with respect to CW. Reiterate Nš 60 with regards to Sheikh Maqsoud 45. 16 November 108 TI Storage of toxic chemicals and planned attacks 46. 17 November 109 RA Attaches letter 259 which references 3 toxic attacks and requests investigation by the OPCW.
OPEN SOURCE ALLEGATIONS OF THE USE OF CHEMICALS AS WEAPONS, 1 DECEMBER 2015 TO 21 NOVEMBER 2016
Date Approximate location Governorate Links 2015 1. 20 December Teir Maalah Homs https://twitter.com/zuzamikulova/status/678845889956487168,
https://twitter.com/EatingMyPeaz/status/678707512338595840,
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=9313079369187842. 22 December Moadamiyah Rif Damashq https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/13165.html,
http://syria.liveuamap.com/en/2015/23-december-report-from-on-sarin-gas-attack-in-western-ghouta,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XHO4VvJSiUQ,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-BAU118uA10,
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1H4kbEE3A9E3pbkj45Gd8LJ4YAJ-KWTXGJkJvAYjvrYs/mobilebasic?pli=1,
http://www.iloubnan.info/politics/91663/The-Syrian-Coalition-accuses-the-Assad-regime-of-new-chemical-attack-against-civilians,
https://t.co/R1IXC8fDRp,
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2015/Dec-23/328727-syria-activists-accuse-government-of-chemical-attack.ashx#.VnqBmns6ja0.twitter,
http://eaworldview.com/2015/12/syria-developing-another-regime-chemical-attack-near-damascus/,
https://www.facebook.com/video.php?v=979121872145932&set=vb.778523135539141&type=2&theater,
http://youtu.be/uBipzVHTIEg,
https://t.co/V36SpBeShG
https://t.co/dttpPyCB5h,
https://t.co/cnDuWI5UDT,
https://t.co/4tllNVfg4S,
http://youtu.be/LIUrcfIXpDg,3. 27 December Jobar Damascus https://twitter.com/KenanRahmani/status/681114215252283392 2016 4. 23 January al-Nashabiyah Rif Damashq http://syria.liveuamap.com/en/2016/23-january-reports-of-chemical-attack-by-saa-targeting-alnashabiyah,
http://syria.liveuamap.com/en/2016/23-january-reports-of-chemical-attack-by-saa-targeting-alnashabiyah,
https://twitter.com/PatsCSW/status/690975419256967168,
https://twitter.com/AEJKhalil/status/6909590187691253785. 31 January Ghouta Rif Damashq https://twitter.com/arrahmah/status/694038744651821056,
https://twitter.com/IraqiSecurity/status/693863618400686080,
http://en.eldorar.com/node/1348,
https://twitter.com/DorarShami/status/693904053345083394,
http://www.arrahmah.com/news/2016/02/01/helikopter-rezim-asad-menjatuhkan-puluhan-bom-barel-yang-mengandung-gas-beracun-di-ghouta-barat.html?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter6. 31 January Moadamiyah Rif Damashq http://syria.liveuamap.com/en/2016/31-january-assad-helos-dropped-52-bombs-on-moadamia-today,
http://syria.liveuamap.com/en/2016/1-february-assad-forces-bombing-al-moadiamyeh-and-daraya,
http://syria.liveuamap.com/en/2016/31-january-victims-of-suffocation-after-shelling-on-moadamiyah,
http://syria.liveuamap.com/en/2016/31-january-alghoutahospital-registered-so-far-97cases-of,
https://twitter.com/RobPulseNews/status/693887279056588801?lang=en,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZoeYmBnP7GQ,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BULMFFEOa1k,
https://twitter.com/CanelaNisa/status/6938558667604869127. 8 March Sheikh Maksoud Aleppo https://www.rt.com/news/334928-ypg-syria-chemical-attack/,
http://aranews.net/2016/03/syrian-islamists-bomb-kurdish-district-aleppo-chemical-weapons-ypg/,
https://www.google.it/maps/place/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%AE+
%D9%85%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%8C+%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A8,%D8%8C+
%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7%E2%80%AD/@36.2315665,37.
1539304,13.67z/data=!4m2!3m1!1s0x152ff9b647cff37f:0x41f2c57414a6e0ee,
https://twitter.com/sayed_ridha/status/707314665634660352,
https://twitter.com/sayed_ridha/status/707311390936080384,8. 13 March Sheikh Maksoud Aleppo https://twitter.com/MmaGreen/status/709092339508051972,
https://twitter.com/Conflicts/status/709095664999899137,
https://twitter.com/QSD00963/status/7090942231114588169. 3 April Qaboun Rif Damashq https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x_BxHD5A2BE&feature=youtu.be,
https://twitter.com/ARnews1936/status/716730561696497665,
https://twitter.com/AEJKhalil/status/716712197527846912,
https://twitter.com/IsraelsVoice/status/716864932734570497,
https://www.facebook.com/493368000712782/photos/a.513998488649733.1073741828.
493368000712782/991418034241107/?type=1&theater,
http://all4syria.info/Archive/304307,
https://www.facebook.com/harstarevo/posts/819355664875924,
https://twitter.com/andreaskorinov/status/716983664136028161,
https://twitter.com/AEJKhalil/status/716710957192450049
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0ri_fwHXukc
https://www.facebook.com/624868630991757/photos/a.631525046992782.
1073741828.624868630991757/840646739413944/?type=1&theater
https://youtu.be/x_BxHD5A2BE,
https://twitter.com/RafekAboazan/status/716678333593952260
https://twitter.com/MohammedGazal87/status/716701874976649216
https://twitter.com/akhbar/status/716713099160584193,
http://eldorar.com/node/9653510. 4 April Deir Ez-zor airbase Deir Ez-zor https://www.rt.com/news/338426-isis-syria-poisonous-gas-attack/,
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2016/04/05/ISIS-use-mustard-gas-in-Deir-Ezzor-airport-attack-.html,
http://www.ibtimes.com/isis-chemical-attacks-islamic-state-used-mustard-gas-during-attack-syrian-military-2348369,
http://www.albawaba.com/news/daesh-launches-chemical-attack-syrian-military-airport-825356,
http://khorasannews-en.com/en/doc/news/3412/daesh-uses-mustard-gas-in-attack-on-syria-airbase,
http://www.newsone.tv/world/islamic-state-militants-use-mustard-gas-in-attack-on-deir-al-zor-airport-in-syria,
http://in.reuters.com/article/mideast-crisis-syria-militants-idINKCN0X12GO,
http://www.france24.com/en/20160405-deadly-gas-attack-syria-army-state-media?ns_campaign=reseaux_sociaux&ns_source=twitter&ns_
mchannel=social&ns_linkname=editorial&aef_campaign_ref=partage_aef&aef_campaign_date
=2016-04-05&dlvrit=66745,
https://twitter.com/HKX07/status/717125022490431488,
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-chemical-weapons-militants-use-mustard-gas-against-syrian-forces-in-battle-for-deir-ez-zor-a6969186.html,
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2016/04/05/ISIS-use-mustard-gas-in-Deir-Ezzor-airport-attack-.html?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter,
http://sana.sy/?p=363661,
http://sana.sy/en/?p=73686,
http://en.alalam.ir/news/1805275,
https://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2016/Apr-05/345702-isis-use-mustard-gas-in-attack-on-deir-al-zor-airport-syrian-state-tv.ashx,
https://francais.rt.com/international/18562-daesh-a-utilise-armes-chimiques,
http://www.worldakhbar.com/middle-east/syria/56458.html11. 7 April Sheikh Maksoud Aleppo http://jinhaber.info/en/ALL-NEWS/content/view/49902,
https://twitter.com/AylinaKilic/status/718067407101771776,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sg-Xxa68VIo,
http://www.aryenhaber.org/haber/2954/aleppo-four-civilians-poisoned-24-killed-in-sheikh-maqsoud-attacks,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NtBgQ1mlUGM&feature=youtu.be,
https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/NewsReports/566845-syria-kurds-accuse-rebels-of-toxic-gas-attack,
http://en.alalam.ir/news/1806220,
https://twitter.com/MassKnowledge/status/720890299065757696,
https://www.facebook.com/RojavaDefenseUnits/posts/985875974816130
https://twitter.com/defenseunits/
https://twitter.com/islamalloush0/status/718121743949414403
https://twitter.com/islamalloush0/status/719877882017943552
https://twitter.com/islamalloush0/status/718410175934263296,
https://twitter.com/mutludc/status/71863881224363212812. 9 April AlTanf Homs https://twitter.com/KyleWOrton/status/718856394766729216
https://twitter.com/CombatChris1/status/718851278143680512
https://twitter.com/CombatChris1/status/718847874818248704
https://twitter.com/NorthernStork/status/718850931270500352
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/06/british-special-forces-operating-inside-syria-alongside-rebels/,
https://smartnews-agency.com/ar/wires/176251/%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%88%D9%82%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B8%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%oAF%D9%o88%D9%o84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%AF%D9%85-%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%B6%D8%AF,
http://www.alasalawatanmya.com/2016/04/09/%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B8%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%86%D9%81-%D8%A8%D9%82%D8%B0%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%81-%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%AD/13. 11 April Al Mayadeen Deir Ez-zor http://isis.liveuamap.com/en/2016/11-april-saa-used-chemical-weapons-against-isis-in-senae,
https://twitter.com/bonniekipperman/status/71947441153180057614. 11 April (may be same as 9 April) AlTanf Homs https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lpT-ZfHLZfc&feature=youtu.be,
http://syria.liveuamap.com/en/2016/11-april-fsa-nsa-in-altanf-showing-evidence-of-isis-chemical,
https://twitter.com/KyleWOrton/status/718856394766729216,
https://twitter.com/YallaSouriya/status/719677727574392832
https://yallasouriya.wordpress.com/2016/04/12/syria-deir-ezzor-rockets-shelled-by-daesh-in-tanf-with-poisonous-gazes/15. 12 April Sheikh Maksoud Aleppo http://www.anfenglish.com/kurdistan/gang-groups-attack-sheikh-maqsoud-with-chemical-gas, 16. 14 April Handarat Aleppo Address of link not saved at the time. 17. 16 April Mt Dakwah Rif Damashq https://twitter.com/Aquila_Fortis/status/721394895269838849
https://twitter.com/RamiAlLolah/status/72136369555781222618. 18 April Al-Eis Aleppo http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Report-Dozens-of-Hezbollah-militants-accidentally-killed-in-chemical-attack-451476?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter,
http://www.kataeb.org/regional/2016/04/18/report-hezbollah-militants-accidentally-killed-in-syria-chemical-attack,
http://www.fggam.org/2016/04/report-dozens-of-hezbollah-militants-accidentally-killed-in-chemical-attack/,
http://m.aljarida.com/pages/news_more/2012811585/0,
https://www.mojahedin.org/newsen/45547?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter,19. 18 April al-Amqiyah Village Hama https://www.facebook.com/LCCSy/posts/1371673949526404,
https://twitter.com/rien4djri/status/722130534818820096,
https://twitter.com/CombatChris1/status/722108786018820097,
https://www.facebook.com/hashtag/amiqa?source=feed_text&story_id=1371673949526404,20. 24 April Jisr al Shughur Idlib https://twitter.com/rien4djri/status/724683274715541504,
https://twitter.com/Syricide/status/602566962451972096,
https://www.facebook.com/493368000712782/photos/a.513998488649733.
1073741828.493368000712782/1003514566364787/?type=1&theater,
http://en.eldorar.com/node/2114,
https://twitter.com/worldonalert/status/724532893817671680,
http://www.futuretvnetwork.com/node/211097,
https://twitter.com/CanelaNisa/status/724402796326322176
https://twitter.com/Bivi_17/status/724486689536790528,
https://twitter.com/TimInHonolulu/status/72686731769968230521. 26 April Taqa village, near Shaddadi, ~60 km S of Hasakah city Al Hasakah http://aranews.net/2016/04/isis-targets-syrian-democratic-forces-chemical-weapons/,
http://www.anfenglish.com/kurdistan/sdf-isis-attacked-our-positions-in-shaddadi-with-chemical-gas,
http://kurdishdailynews.org/2016/04/27/turkey-backed-isis-terrorists-attack-kurdish-positions-in-shaddadi-with-chemical-gas-sdf/,
https://twitter.com/Delvin_Azem/status/725568694244495361,
https://twitter.com/DefenseUnits/status/725304752393826306,
https://twitter.com/IntellFusion/status/72563772076527206422. 1 May Al-Aqaba, Aleppo City Aleppo http://syria.liveuamap.com/en/2016/1-may-unconfirmed-but-halab-news-reports-an-assad-toxic-gas,
https://twitter.com/HalabNewsN/status/726832442179485701,
https://twitter.com/TimInHonolulu/status/726867317699682305
https://www.facebook.com/HNN.Halab/posts/74981400845519723. 2 May North Aleppo Aleppo Address of link not saved at the time. 24. 22 May Jobar Damascus https://twitter.com/JobarRev/status/734826792784134144,
https://twitter.com/Malcolmite/status/734783297658736640,
https://syrianpc.com/en/regime-forces-targeted-jobar-district-in-damascus-with-chlorine-after-failing-to-break-into/,
https://www.facebook.com/hashtag/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%AF?source=feed_text&storyid=61392288876757925. 17 May Sheikh Maksoud Aleppo http://english.almanar.com.lb/adetails.php?eid=270301&cid=23&fromval=1&frid=23&seccatid=20&s1=1#.VzxudSNBVjI.twitter,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dAESuOs0R0c26. 30 May Al-Waar Homs https://twitter.com/QasiounNewsAR/status/737228575057793024 27. 15 June E Ghouta Rif Damashq http://217.218.67.231/Detail/2016/06/17/470840/Syria%20Damascus%20Ghouta%20chemical%20arms,
http://sana.sy/en/?p=80313
http://www.sana.sy/?p=394743 (translation of doctor available)
http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-mideast-crisis-syria-chemicalweapons-idUKKCN0Z21UZ
https://uk.news.yahoo.com/syria-govt-says-rebels-poisonous-weapons-insurgents-deny-143832500.html
http://3robanews.com/arab/19382/%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B8%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A9-%D9%86%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%B4%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%A9.html
https://arabic.rt.com/news/827991-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%8A%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%86%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%B4%D9%82-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%82/
http://www.aliwaa.com/Article.aspx?ArticleId=288997 (minor mention in larger article)
http://news.trust.org/item/20160616144138-q8x3l/?source=fiOtherNews2http://news.trust.org/item/20160616144138-q8x3l/?source=fiOtherNews228. 22 June Near Tabqa (to the South) in W Raqqa Raqqa https://www.almayadeen.net/latestnews/2016/6/22/210184/%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%81-%D8%A7;
https://www.facebook.com/2.Network.Aleppocountryside.89/?fref=nf;
http://syrianow.sy/index.php?d=69&id=145458;
http://sputniknews.com/middleeast/20160622/1041773915/daesh-gas-raqqa.html,
http://www.voltairenet.org/article192492.html,
http://alhurrahadath.com/5700--.html,
http://www.faceiraq.com/inews.php?id=4887710,
http://www.voltairenet.org/article192488.html
https://twitter.com/RamiAlLolah/status/745645840379809792,
https://twitter.com/IvanSidorenko1/status/74602210297790464129. 23 June Haritan Aleppo https://twitter.com/rami_swed/status/746477013112881153;
https://twitter.com/salqin/status/746456843170516993
https://twitter.com/almotasem8/status/747144601883054081
https://twitter.com/Wesal_TV/status/746477969644871680
https://twitter.com/shahed_alep/status/746445326777745410
https://twitter.com/95_aboislam/status/746444299936595969
https://twitter.com/ff5b413dda60423/status/746433998226743296
https://twitter.com/ahbah7/status/746430170475692033
https://twitter.com/HalabTodayTV/status/746429705121832960
https://twitter.com/HalabTodayTV/status/746597713819631616
https://twitter.com/ahmad09904/status/747184349267755008
https://twitter.com/ZakariaNassani/status/746443861199847425
https://twitter.com/RevolutionSyria/status/745873637182431232
https://twitter.com/xmanw2011/status/745386208713388032
https://twitter.com/SyrianCoalition/status/745180922668949505
https://twitter.com/ZakariaNassani/status/744885292885221376;
https://twitter.com/fadail_al_ilm/status/746498635702112256
https://www.instagram.com/p/BHESnL1h4Oz/
https://twitter.com/sh3uibalskar20/status/74658763665185177630. 26 June East Ghouta Rif Damashq http://coolamnews.com/utilisation-darmes-chimiques-dans-la-zone-rurale-a-lest-de-damas/ 31. 29 June Jobar Damascus http://www.orient-news.net/en/news_show/116292/0/Assad-terrorists-attack-Damascus-Jobar-with-poisonous-gas
https://twitter.com/OrientNewsEn/status/748342891311955968
https://twitter.com/EagleSyrian1/status/748193259848105984
https://www.facebook.com/Douma.Revolution.2011/posts/1077680792312835,
https://twitter.com/observesyria/status/748437523399991296,
http://www.voa-islam.com/read/world-news/2016/06/30/44942/rezim-teroris-assad-serang-daerah-opo-sisi-di-jobar-damaskus-dengan-gas-beracun/?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter#sthash.gUzjqlgk.dpbs,
http://www.nabdsyria.tv/Article/8684,
https://twitter.com/syrianews_now/status/74822649890198323232. 29 June Al-Mallah Aleppo https://twitter.com/news_syrianall1/status/748543065644736515,
https://twitter.com/N_workMediaHoms/status/748420401391411200
https://twitter.com/syria_pulse/status/748432198831841280
https://twitter.com/azsxa23/status/748432244298088448
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h_9n9XVFeJo&feature=youtu.be
https://twitter.com/news_syrianall1/status/748543065644736515,
https://yallasouriya.wordpress.com/2016/06/29/syriaalepporegime-targets-al-malah-with-chlorine/,
https://www.facebook.com/SYRIA.AGENCY/posts/1014611785242782,
https://twitter.com/mheealden88/status/748222377348177920,
https://twitter.com/Syria_Rebels/status/748219024102801408,
https://www.facebook.com/ShaamNetwork.Arabic/posts/1212312535485985,
https://twitter.com/rayhane_alsham/status/749702722195169280
https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=646151398875512&id=10000441973578833. 3 July Karm Al-Myassar Aleppo https://twitter.com/ALAMAWI/status/749698157068574720, 34. 20 July Kafr Hamrah Aleppo https://syrianpc.com/%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%o84%oD9%o89-%D9%o83%oD9%81%D8%B1-%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D9%88/,
https://www.facebook.com/HalabTodayTV/posts/144017770933299635. 23 July Various, Aleppo City Aleppo http://alburaq-media.com/%D9%85%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%B5-%D8%A3%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AB-%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A8-%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%81%D9%87%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A8%D8%AA-2016723-%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7/ 36. 1 August Saraqeb Idlib https://twitter.com/AJABreaking/status/760231221653827584,
https://twitter.com/Conflicts/status/760350223843680256
https://twitter.com/reportedly/status/760233110835335169
https://twitter.com/JoeEEnglish/status/760348715605434369
https://twitter.com/JakeGodin/status/760285721475198976
https://twitter.com/NoorNahas1/status/760284229741740032
https://twitter.com/whitehelmets_sy/status/760239870354792448
https://twitter.com/EagleSyrian1/status/760229732877266945
http://syria.liveuamap.com/en/2016/1-august-several-suffocated-including-a-child-and-woman-in,
https://twitter.com/Syria_Rebels/status/760213137505259520
https://twitter.com/salqin/status/760218226764738560
https://twitter.com/RadioAlKul/status/760214312636088320
https://twitter.com/HosamAlhaji/status/760217421479280641,
http://www.interpretermag.com/august-01-2016/#14721,
http://globalnews.ca/news/2861443/authorities-play-blame-game-after-toxic-gas-attack-in-syrias-aleppo/,
http://www.presstv.us/Detail/2016/08/03/478214/Syria-Aleppo-gas-attack-Saraqib,
http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Terrorist-chemical-weapon-attack-kills-5-in-Aleppo-Syrian-regime-claims-46304237. 2 August Old City in Aleppo Aleppo http://sana.sy/en/?p=84234,
http://globalnews.ca/news/2861443/authorities-play-blame-game-after-toxic-gas-attack-in-syrias-aleppo/,
https://southfront.org/militants-use-chemical-weapons-in-aleppo-city/,
http://www.presstv.us/Detail/2016/08/03/478214/Syria-Aleppo-gas-attack-Saraqib,
http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Terrorist-chemical-weapon-attack-kills-5-in-Aleppo-Syrian-regime-claims-463042,
http://z-news.xyz/the-militants-accused-of-using-chemical-weapons-in-aleppo/,
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-russia-idUSKCN10F220?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=
feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Reuters%2FworldNews+%28Reuters+World+News%2938. 2 August Kafr Takarem Idlib https://twitter.com/AbdalmalikSy/status/760237340132577280, https://twitter.com/syriafree339/status/760243395902201856 39. No date given1 Al-Aqaba Aleppo http://en.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13950525001024 40. 7 August Ramouseh Aleppo https://smartnews-agency.com/ar/wires/191104/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B7%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%A4%D9%83%D8%AF-%D9%84%D9%80-%D8%B3%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=facebook&utm_campaign=smart+news+agency+++-+++%D9%88%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9+%D8%B3%D9%85%D8%
A7%D8%B1%D8%AA+%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%86%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%A141. 8 August Khan Al-asal Aleppo https://smartnews-agency.com/ar/wires/191104/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B7%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%A4%D9%83%D8%AF-%D9%84%D9%80-%D8%B3%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=facebook&utm_campaign=smart+news+agency+++-+++%D9%88%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%
A9+%D8%B3%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA+%D9%84%D9%84%D8%
A3%D9%86%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%A1,
https://www.facebook.com/SMARTNewsAgency/?fref=ts,
https://twitter.com/barq_news/status/762580579753787392,
https://twitter.com/jisrtv/status/762642102589255680,
https://twitter.com/MediaCenterfr/status/762597827369402368,
https://twitter.com/Syriamubasher/status/762593698387488768,
https://twitter.com/alnateq2/status/762585682611204096,
https://twitter.com/shahed_alep/status/762579941527588866,
https://twitter.com/AleppoAMC/status/762569227932987392,
https://twitter.com/ALAMAWI/status/762564875642175492,
https://twitter.com/Maraei_Halabi/status/76256338508719718442. 10 August Zubdiya, Aleppo Aleppo https://twitter.com/TheSyriaCmpgn/status/763447153943539712
https://twitter.com/MahmoudRashwani/status/763459693327056896
https://twitter.com/Paradoxy13/status/763454656253194240
https://twitter.com/MahmoudRashwani/status/763459509796925440'
https://twitter.com/JakeGodin/status/763487670848872448
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/08/syria-civil-war-suspected-chemical-attack-aleppo-160811051215993.html
https://youtu.be/4bHvZBVuTSI
http://hisz.rsoe.hu/alertmap/database/?pageid=event_desc&edis_id=CR-20160811-54522-SYR
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-gas-idUSKCN10L2QW
http://news.sky.com/story/syria-suspected-chlorine-gas-attack-in-aleppo-10531446
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-un-idUSKCN10M16M
https://twitter.com/OrientNewsEn/status/763718839033073664
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-37049555,
http://news.sky.com/story/aleppo-boris-johnson-deeply-concerned-despite-new-ceasefire-hope-10531446,
https://www.bellingcat.com/uncategorized/2016/08/13/reports-of-chlorine-gas-that-targeted-civilians-in-aleppo/43. 12 August Hraytan Aleppo http://www.lcc-sy.com/2016/08/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D8%B6%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A8-%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%AF%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%8B-%D9%88%D8%A2%D8%AE%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%81%D9%89-%D8%A8%D8%A7/,
https://www.facebook.com/LCCSy/44. 16 August Marea Aleppo https://www.alsouria.net/content/%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%8B-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%AF%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B6%D8%A9-%oD8%AA%D9%o86%oD8%oB8%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A9
https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=515908775279777&id=100005819765677
http://aranews.org/2016/08/%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B9-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A8-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AA/
http://iran-daily.com/News/167011.html
http://yournewswire.com/isis-carries-out-chemical-attack-on-residential-areas-in-syria/
https://twitter.com/LindaHemby/status/765860929913270272
https://twitter.com/middleeastwars/status/765571675052179456
https://twitter.com/markito0171/status/765583644635303936
https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/NewsReports/567282-isis-strikes-fsa-held-town-with-toxic-gas-activists
https://twitter.com/EliotHiggins/status/765612884223201280
http://video.news.com.au/v/495281/SYRIA-Workers-Remove-Alleged-Chemical-Munitions-Following-Islamic-State-Attack-in-Marea-August-1645. 16 Augsut Aleppo City Aleppo http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2016/08/16/480341/Daesh-chemical-attack-Syria-Aleppo 46. 20 August Hasakah city Hasakah https://twitter.com/markito0171/status/767286118039642112 47. 25 August Dandaniyah, nr Manbij Aleppo http://hisz.rsoe.hu/alertmap/database/?pageid=event_summary&edis_id=CR-20160826-54736-SYR,
https://twitter.com/Mexlumy/status/768907938714955776,
https://twitter.com/Dikrambalekani/status/768895819026165760,
https://twitter.com/kurdistannews24/status/769088319133216769,
https://twitter.com/todayinsyria/status/769088528970051584,
https://twitter.com/kurdistannews24/status/769089800209129472,
http://en.hawarnews.com/akp-gangs-use-chemical-gas-in-dendeniye-village/,
https://southfront.org/turkish-led-forces-use-chemical-weapons-against-sdf-northwest-of-manbij/,
http://syria.liveuamap.com/en/2016/25-august-kurdish-videos-show-people-with-chemical-burns,
https://twitter.com/mutludc/status/768896445747462144,
http://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/25082016,
https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/anha-turkish-forces-use-chemical-weapons-manbij/,
http://en.hawarnews.com/turkish-army-commits-a-massacre-in-manbij-civilians-slain/48. 28 August Qabr al Englizi/Qabr al Inglizi Aleppo https://twitter.com/ZaitonMagazine/status/770144842697637888,
https://twitter.com/sorya33_gehadk/status/770043703473926144,
https://twitter.com/jisrtv/status/770033192946524160,
https://twitter.com/jisrtv/status/770014498786869248,
https://twitter.com/ALAMAWI/status/769951855631798274,
https://twitter.com/syrialive54/status/769939532938612736,
https://twitter.com/allsory_allhor/status/76992631641836748849. 5 September Marea Aleppo http://www.shaam.org/reports/battleground-reports/%20%D8%AD%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AB-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AD%D8%AF-04-09-2016
http://aranews.org/2016/09/%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%81-%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A8-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A7/50. 6 September Al Sukari Aleppo http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-37292143,
http://linkis.com/com/UXUur,
http://english.aawsat.com/2016/09/article55357878/rescue-workers-report-suspected-aleppo-chlorine-attack-choking-dozens,
https://twitter.com/Ghada12180130/status/773447348752121857 (Video),
https://twitter.com/doammuslims/status/773163705710342144,
https://twitter.com/doammuslims/status/773150952652148736,
https://twitter.com/NorthernStork/status/773121403784683520,
https://twitter.com/IranArabSpring/status/773038679728201728,
https://twitter.com/FSAPlatform/status/773406315540512769,
https://twitter.com/AimanofArabia/status/773197357861179392,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vBJg67hNK3c,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/09/syria-war-chlorine-gas-dropped-rebel-held-aleppo-160906153118935.html,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/06/syrian-government-chlorine-gas-aleppo,
https://yallasouriya.wordpress.com/2016/09/06/syriaaleppoattack-with-chlorine-on-sukkari-neighborhood/,
http://syria.liveuamap.com/en/2016/29-july-reports-of-a-new-regime-chlorine-gas-attack-on-aleppos,
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20160907-footage-shows-aftermath-of-brutal-chlorine-gas-attack-in-sukari-aleppo/,
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-aleppo-idUSKCN11C1S5?il=0,
http://elbashayeronline.com/news-702393.html
http://radar2.net/External-275512.html
http://www.qasioun.net/ar/news/show/36453/%D8%B6%D8%AD%D8
%A7%D9%8A%D8%A7_%D8%A8%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81_%D8%A7%
D9%84%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85_%D8%A7%D9%84%
D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A_%D8%AD%D9%8A_%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%
A8%D8%B1_%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%
B2%D8%A7%D8%AA_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A9,
http://www.thedailystar.net/world/middle-east/dozens-choke-aleppo-1282033,51. 6 September Tarma/Ghouta Damascus http://syria.liveuamap.com/en/2016/7-september-reports-of-a-new-chemical-attack-in-ein-tarma,
https://twitter.com/DannyNis/status/773358709468725248,
https://twitter.com/Paradoxy13/status/773287216202252288,
https://twitter.com/salahshoork/status/773494891468816384,
https://twitter.com/anadoluagency/status/773473551986880512,
https://twitter.com/monaalami/status/773428694648053761,
https://twitter.com/Paradoxy13/status/773287216202252288,
https://twitter.com/Navsteva/status/773265789210222592,
http://www.yenisafak.com/en/world/assad-forces-drop-chlorine-gas-in-damascus-syria-2526863,
http://www.worldbulletin.net/middle-east/177124/regime-forces-drop-chlorine-gas-in-damascus52. 16 September Umm Hawsh / Um Hosh / Maarsad um Hawsh Aleppo http://aranews.net/2016/09/islamic-state-extremists-launch-chemical-attack-kurdish-villages-northwest-syria/,
http://www.hispantv.com/noticias/siria/288237/armas-quimicas-isis-ataque-alepo,
http://www.presstv.ir/DetailFa/2016/09/17/485100/Syria-Aleppo-Daesh-chemical-attack-Harbal-Um-Hosh-SDF-Afrin,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0wNAAIRH0A8,
http://alwaght.com/en/News/67839/ISIS-Chemical-Attack-on-Aleppo,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aMdwzxJUz2A,
https://zindinews.com/%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D9%8A%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%A3%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A/,
http://alwaght.com/fa/News/67876/%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%87-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B4%DB%8C%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF,
http://xeber24.org/144229.html,
http://www.alchourouk.com/201281/675/1/%C2%AB%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4%C2%BB-%D9%8A%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%85-%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A8--%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%A9.html53. 28 September Karah Hama https://www.google.it/maps/place/%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%8C
+%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7%E2%80%AD/@35.3442308,36.8382937,15.17z/data=!4m13!1m7!
3m6!1s0x0:0x0!2zMzXCsDIwJzE2LjAiTiAzNsKwNDknNTMuMCJF!3b1!8m2
!3d35.3377778!4d36.8313889!3m4!1s0x152493b62a30a16d:0xf741ee79ee510865!8m2!3d35.3430409!4d36.834446554. 1 October Locale of Kafr Zita Hama http://sinnews.co/?p=50510,
https://youtu.be/e85s0DXYGVs,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kbs0bNNVEnw
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_0L-nlkvQe0
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xRG1qHuFNqI
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-5k4vsBDfd0
https://twitter.com/JulianRoepcke/status/782541734073040896
https://twitter.com/DannyNis/status/782269835346636801
https://twitter.com/DannyNis/status/782287202650820608
https://twitter.com/baladinetwork/status/782286379116101636
https://twitter.com/JulianRoepcke/status/782541734073040896
https://twitter.com/SyriaCivilDef/status/782586004322586624
http://baladi-news.com/en/news/details/10929/Dozens_of_cases_of_suffocation_with_Toxic_gas_in_Hama,
https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=1086000994782484&id=593027507413171,
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2016/10/13/examining-chlorine-attack-kafarzita-hama-october-1st-2016/55. 3 October Kafarya and Al Fu'ah Villages Idlib http://theiranproject.com/blog/2016/10/03/terrorists-launch-chemical-attack-syrias-kefraya-foua/,
https://sputniknews.com/middleeast/20161003/1045956622/attack-syria-chemicals.html,
https://www.facebook.com/SyrianWarNewsInfoMedia/posts/916824435090165
http://veterans.linkedlocalnetwork.net/2016/10/us-backed-terrorists-gas-syrian-civilians -again/,
http://www.veteranstoday.com/2016/10/03/us/,
http://theiranproject.com/blog/2016/10/03/terrorists-launch-chemical-attack-syrias-kefraya-foua/,
http://veterans.dfns.net/2016/10/03/us/,
https://www.google.it/maps/place/Kafarya,+Syria/@35.9890135,
36.6677284,15z/data=!3m1!4b1!4m5!3m4!1s0x15250be0d6a4561d:0x2f57fa6d7333dc9d!8m2!3d35.990733!4d36.
6791536?hl=en> and al-Fu'ah<https://www.google.it/maps/place/Al+Fu'ah,+Syria/@35.982918,36.6853235,1 4z/data=!3m1!4b1!4m5!3m4!1s0x15250c044c28668f:0xe0b05d6a080aff65!8m2!3d3 5.9819344!4d36.7058202?hl=en> in northern Idleb province with shells containing Chlorine,
https://sputniknews.com/middleeast/20161003/1045956622/attack-syria-chemicals.html?56. 6 October Umm Hawsh / Um Hosh / Maarsad um Hawsh Aleppo http://www.iraqinews.com/arab-world-news/isis-shells-sdf-headquarters-chemical-weapons/
http://basnews.com/index.php/en/news/kurdistan/30322857. 17 October Ltamenah Hama https://twitter.com/markito0171/status/787925883311034369,
http://aranews.org/2016/10/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B7%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83-%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%84-%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%81-%D8%AD/,
https://twitter.com/GerV29/status/788031233582325760,58. 30 October 3000 Apartments project, Hamadaniyah, al-assad, 1070 Apartments project Aleppo https://www.rt.com/news/364737-syria-aleppo-poison-gas/,
http://sana.sy/en/?p=92011,
https://twitter.com/worldonalert/status/792704168406478848,
https://twitter.com/LegitCFCPundit/status/792676878968557568,
https://sputniknews.com/middleeast/201610301046887398-aleppo-chemical-weapons/,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pVIcSSTrFrA&oref=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DpVIcSSTrFrA&has_verified=1,
http://www.news24.com/World/News/syria-state-media-says-rebels-fire-toxic-gas-in-aleppo-20161030,
https://twitter.com/maytham956/status/792714143421857792,
http://www.pravdareport.com/news/hotspots/terror/31-10-2016/136023-chemical_weapons_aleppo-0/,
http://presstv.com//Detail/2016/10/30/491366/Militants-chemical-attack-residential-areas-Dahiyet-alAssad-Hamdaniyeh-Aleppo-Takfiri-militants,
http://www.libya-al-mostakbal.org/10/9169/%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B6%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%86%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A8.html,
http://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/1545260
http://sabanews.net/ar/news445354.htm
https://twitter.com/maytham956/status/792714143421857792
https://twitter.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/792695824182640640,
https://twitter.com/maytham956/status/793096013686906880,
http://www.pravdareport.com/video/01-11-2016/136035-syria-0/,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YmUaIOkgKI0,
https://twitter.com/raging545/status/792313430355087360 (29th....?),59. 31 October Rashidin Aleppo https://twitter.com/EA_WorldView/status/793034384177848320,
http://syria.liveuamap.com/en/2016/31-october-proassad-forces-shelled-again-aleppos-alrashedeen,
http://eaworldview.com/2016/10/syria-daily-pro-assad-forces-try-to-hold-back-rebel-offensive-aleppo/#chlorine,
https://twitter.com/Paradoxy13/status/793187082030223360,
https://twitter.com/Omar_Madaniah/status/793037421101318144,
https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/2016/10/31/%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A8%D8%B3%D9%82%D9%88%D8%B7-%D9%82%D8%B0%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%81-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A8-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%AF%D9%85-%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A9,60. 2 November Khan Al Assal & Kafr Naha Aleppo http://www.lcc-sy.com/2016/11/%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A8-9-%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A8/,
http://syria.liveuamap.com/en/2016/3-november-suspected-chlorine-attacks-in-aleppo-western-countryside,
https://twitter.com/SyriaCivilDef/status/794153697714573312,
http://www.qasioun.net/ar/news/show/41264/%D8%A7%
D9%84%D8%B7%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86_
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AD%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%82
%D9%8A%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%84_%D8%AA%D8
%AD%D9%88%D9%8A_%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2_%D8%A7
%D9%84%D9%83%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%B9%D9%84
%D9%89%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%81%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A8,61. 3 November New Aleppo Region Aleppo https://sputniknews.com/middleeast/201611031047034560-aleppo-poisonous-gas/,
https://twitter.com/A_Ozkok/status/794150563214741505,
http://sana.sy/?p=454267,
http://www.almayadeen.net/news/politics/45340/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%AD%D9%84%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%A4%D9%87-%D9%8A%D9%81%D8%B4%D9%84%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A3%D8%B6%D8%AE%D9%85-%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85-%D9%84%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AC%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A8,
http://sana.sy/en/?p=93460,62. 7 November Khan Al Assal Aleppo https://twitter.com/AhmadAlkhtiib/status/795565114917343232,
https://twitter.com/Paradoxy13/status/795523772371632129,
https://twitter.com/MostafaMe4/status/795896863853527040,
https://twitter.com/22_jussy/status/795818975938674688,
https://www.facebook.com/fares.elryeeh/posts/1137188853033436,
https://twitter.com/RevolutionSyria/status/795796449992667142,
http://eaworldview.com/2016/11/syria-daily-kurdish-led-forces-declares-offensive-to-take-isis-held-raqqa/#deaths,
http://baladi-news.com/en/news/details/12352/Assad&39;s_regime_targets_Khan_al_Assal_in_Aleppo_with_toxic_#chlorine,
https://yallasouriya.wordpress.com/2016/11/07/syria-news-briefattacks-with-chlorine-on-khan-asal-in-aleppo-and-with-napalm-on-douma-in-damascus-suburbs/,63. 13 November Nayrab (near airport) Aleppo https://arabic.rt.com/news/849500-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%B9%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A8%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A8-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B1/,
https://twitter.com/leithfadel/status/797958628628111360,
https://sputniknews.com/middleeast/201611131047393027-aleppo-gas-attack/,
http://www.almayadeen.net/news/politics/46171/%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%B9-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A,
https://topnews-nasserkandil.com/final/Full_News.php?id=66141,
https://www.rt.com/news/366799-aleppo-chemical-weapons-attack/#.WCmrn39sVKo.twitter,
https://twitter.com/maytham956/status/798113997572685824,
https://southfront.org/militants-used-toxic-gas-near-aleppo-airport-report/,
https://www.facebook.com/dimashq.now/,64. 18 November Hanano Aleppo http://syria.liveuamap.com/en/2016/18-november-airstrikes-with-chlorine-gas-on-hanano-neigborhood,
http://www.enabbaladi.net/archives/114373,
http://www.baladi-news.com/ar/news/details/12760/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%AF_
%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81_%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A8
_%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AA_
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A9_%D9%88%D8%AD%
D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA_%D8%A7%D8%AE,
https://twitter.com/raging545/status/800452742665895936
https://twitter.com/Rami_Zien/status/799528835091988480
%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%82_%D8%A8%D8%B5%D9%81%D9%88%D9%81
_%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86,
https://twitter.com/EatingMyPeaz/status/799545258078072832,
https://twitter.com/Rami_Zien/status/799528835091988480,
https://twitter.com/JfshamJf/status/799522415571333120,
https://twitter.com/raging545/status/800452742665895936 (video)65. 18/19 November Ard Al Hamra / Al Sakhour Aleppo http://syria.liveuamap.com/en/2016/20-november-graphic-video-family-of-six-including-4-children,
http://www.krcrtv.com/news/eastern-aleppo-blitz-kills-almost-300-in-5-days/174736597,
http://edition.cnn.com/2016/11/20/middleeast/syria-aleppo-airstrikes/,
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-idUSKBN13F0HS,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-38043157,
http://www.qasioun.net/en/news/show/42872/Chlorine_
Over_Sakhour_%E2%80%A6Regime_Willing_To_Advance_In_Sheikh_Najjar,_Aleppo,
https://twitter.com/AEJKhalil/status/800671804230483968,
http://www.skynewsarabia.com/web/article/894014/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%AD%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A8-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B1,
http://www.elghad.co/world/news-81545,
http://www.akhbaralaan.net/news/arab-world/2016/11/20/%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%88%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%A8%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%88%D9%8A-%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D8%AD%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A8,
http://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2016/11/20/%D8%B6%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BA%D9%88%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D9%88%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%89-
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