Equipo Nizkor - S/2016/904 - Comparative analysis provided by Russia of implementation of Russia-US agreement on Syria.

United Nations
Security Council

S/2016/904

Distr.: General
27 October 2016
English
Original: Russian

Letter dated 27 October 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a comparative analysis of the implementation of the agreements between Russia and the United States on Syria (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would circulate this letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) V. Churkin

Annex to the letter dated 27 October 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: English and Russian]

Comparative analysis of implementation of Russia-US agreement

No. Commitment Russia, Syrian Govt. US-led Coalition, opposition groups Result

Russia-US Joint Statement on Cessation of Hostilities in Syria of 22 February 2016

1. Implement the cessation of hostilities (CoH) on the whole territory of Syria beginning from 12 a.m. on 27 February 2016 Ensured the implementation of the CoH as per schedule. Ensured the implementation of the CoH within the prescribed time only by a part of the "moderate" opposition.
20 groups continued armed hostilities.
2,031 violations of the CoH on the part of the "moderate" opposition had been reported between 27 February and 1 September which claimed lives of 3,532 army men and 12,800 civilians. 8,949 army men and 25,642 civilians have been injured.

2. Informing the Russian Federation and USA on the accession to the CoH by 12 p.m. on 26 February 2016 Handed over the list of 47 "moderate" opposition groups. Presented a list of 138 "moderate" opposition groups, of which 2 belong to ISIS, and 8 to the Al-Nusra Front. Failure to separate the moderate opposition from radical terrorist groups.

3. Exchanging information between the Russian Federation and USA on the outlines of areas held by CoH parties. Presented the information on areas in which operate 47 "moderate" opposition groups. Presented no information on areas of operation. Failure to outline the areas held by "moderate" opposition groups to distinguish the violators of the CoH.

4. Identify areas held by ISIS and the Al-Nusra Front. Transferred the available data on the positions of Al-Nusra and ISIS to the USA during the consultations. Informed that the information provided by the Russian side is not accurate; during the consultations transferred a general scheme of areas controlled by Al-Nusra which does not allow to distinguish the "moderate" opposition from Al-Nusra. Al-Nusra Front restored its combat capabilities and intensified the offensive on the Syrian government forces as well as terrorist attacks on civilians.

5. Resume strikes against ISIS and the Al-Nusra Front. Continued making up to 150 strikes in a day on ISIS and the Al-Nusra Front. Liberated 586 towns, 12,360 sq. km of territory, eliminated about 35,000 terrorists, including 2,700 Russian and CIS nationals. Did not carry out strikes against the Al-Nusra Front.
Carried out between 6 and 15 strikes a day against ISIS.
Compared to 2015, the number of terrorist acts perpetrated by the Al-Nusra suicide bombers increased twofold.

6. Create the ISSG Ceasefire Task Force. As per schedule, Russian representatives arrived at Geneva to work as part of the ISSG. United States representatives arrived at Geneva according to schedule. The activity of the ISSG Ceasefire Task Force resulted in the exchange of data on the violations of the COH.

7. Create a mechanism to monitor the compliance of the COH. Established a Centre for reconciliation of opposing sides in Syria, sent its representatives to all of the provinces in order to monitor the implementation of the agreements at the command points of the government forces, as well as to keep direct contact with provincial governors. Up to 70 UAV units, as well as aviation. The assessment of the situation was carried out based on the information found in the social media and the press. An objective monitoring system that would suit all the parties could not be created.

8. Establish a hotline between the airbase at Khmeimim and the US military and political analysis group based in Amman (Jordan). A direct communications line was established within the set timeframe. By the unilateral decision of the US, contact with Amman was suspended starting from 28 July 2016, and the US military and political analysis group was disbanded. Persistent appeals by the Russian Federation to the United States to put pressure on the violators of the COH have demonstrated the US lacks leverage to exert influence on the opposition forces.

9. Promote a political transition in Syria. Arranged for the inclusion of elders from 847 towns and villages and 69 units of "moderate" opposition into the reconciliation process.
Contributed to the drafting of a new Syrian constitution.
Failed to persuade the "moderate" opposition to withdraw the ultimatum for Bashar al-Assad to resign before the elections. The political process came to standstill.

Russia-US Agreement of 9 September 2016 on Reduction of Violence, Unimpeded and Sustained Humanitarian Access, and the Establishment of a Joint Implementation Centre

1. Resume the Cessation of Hostilities (CoH) on the whole territory of Syria starting at 7 p.m. on 12 September 2016. Made sure that the Syrian army observed the CoH.
Monitored how the agreements were observed through video surveillance posting the feed online.
Despite violations extended the CoH twice (48 and 72 hours). The CoH lasted 7 days altogether.
Failed to compel the "moderate" opposition to observe the CoH. From 12-19 September 2016, "moderate" opposition groups violated the CoH 302 times. Civilian casualties: 83 dead, 252 injured. The Syrian Army lost 153 people.

2. Set up a Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) checkpoint on Castello Road. Set up a SARC checkpoint in the western section of Castello Road on 14 September 2016. Failed to work with the "moderate" opposition to set up a checkpoint on Castello Road. No access for the UN's humanitarian convoys.

3. The Syrian army and "moderate" opposition forces pull back from Castello Road observing the following distances:
tanks and artillery: 3 -3.5 km
AFVs, heavy machine guns: 2.5 km
troops with small arms: 1 km
observation posts: 500 m
Began to pull back from Castello Road twice -- on 15-16 September 2016.
Since the opposition didn't follow through on the obligations to pull back, the Syrian army units went back to their positions
Failed to compel the opposition forces to pull back from Castello Road. No guarantee of safety for the UN's humanitarian convoys.

4. Organize humanitarian aid deliveries to Aleppo Set up 7 checkpoints for civilians to leave Aleppo and 1 checkpoint for armed rebels.
Coordinated the UN's humanitarian aid deliveries
Rebels planted explosives in all exit points from Aleppo. Harassed civilians who tried to leave the city.
Leaders of opposition groups refused to let UN humanitarian convoys through.
Civilians in Aleppo have no food, no medical supplies and no way out of the city.

5. Establish a Joint Implementation Centre to plan joint operations against ISIS and the Al-Nusra Front. Russian representatives arrived at the JIC, but could not commence deliberations due to a refusal from US representatives. US representatives arrived at the JIC, but did not commence deliberations following instructions from Washington. Joint planning of operations against ISIS and the Al-Nusra Front by Russian Aerospace Forces and USAF never launched.

6. Launch joint operations against ISIS and the Al-Nusra Front. Russian Aerospace Forces have single-handedly continued air strikes against ISIS and Al-Nusra targets (50 sorties, 140-150 air strikes a day on average). The USAF has not attacked Al-Nusra targets. Their operations against ISIS average 12-15 sorties, 8-10 air strikes a day. On 17 September 2016, the USAF bombed Syrian Army positions near Deir ez-Zor, killing 62 and injuring more than 100 personnel. Joint US-Russian operations against ISIS and the Al-Nusra Front never launched, allowing terrorists to retain control over a large territory and carry out offensive operations against government troops.

Information
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No.	Commitment	Russia, Syrian Govt.	US-led Coalition, opposition groups	Result
Russia-US Joint Statement on Cessation of Hostilities in Syria of 22 February 2016
1.	Implement the cessation of hostilities (CoH) on the whole territory of Syria beginning from 12 a.m. on 27 February 2016	Ensured the implementation of the CoH as per schedule.	Ensured the implementation of the CoH within the prescribed time only by a part of the "moderate" opposition. 20 groups continued armed hostilities.	2,031 violations of the CoH on the part of the "moderate" opposition had been reported between 27 February and 1 September which claimed lives of 3,532 army men and 12,800 civilians. 8,949 army men and 25,642 civilians have been injured.
2.	Informing the Russian Federation and USA on the accession to the CoH by 12 p.m. on 26 February 2016	Handed over the list of 47 "moderate" opposition groups.	Presented a list of 138 "moderate" opposition groups, of which 2 belong to ISIS, and 8 to the Al-Nusra Front.	Failure to separate the moderate opposition from radical terrorist groups.
3.	Exchanging information between the Russian Federation and USA on the outlines of areas held by CoH parties.	Presented the information on areas in which operate 47 "moderate" opposition groups.	Presented no information on areas of operation.	Failure to outline the areas held by "moderate" opposition groups to distinguish the violators of the CoH.
4.	Identify areas held by ISIS and the Al-Nusra Front.	Transferred the available data on the positions of Al-Nusra and ISIS to the USA during the consultations.	Informed that the information provided by the Russian side is not accurate; during the consultations transferred a general scheme of areas controlled by Al-Nusra which does not allow to distinguish the "moderate" opposition from Al-Nusra.	Al-Nusra Front restored its combat capabilities and intensified the offensive on the Syrian government forces as well as terrorist attacks on civilians.
5.	Resume strikes against ISIS and the Al-Nusra Front.	Continued making up to 150 strikes in a day on ISIS and the Al-Nusra Front. Liberated 586 towns, 12,360 sq. km of territory, eliminated about 35,000 terrorists, including 2,700 Russian and CIS nationals.	Did not carry out strikes against the Al-Nusra Front. Carried out between 6 and 15 strikes a day against ISIS.	Compared to 2015, the number of terrorist acts perpetrated by the Al-Nusra suicide bombers increased twofold.
6.	Create the ISSG Ceasefire Task Force.	As per schedule, Russian representatives arrived at Geneva to work as part of the ISSG.	United States representatives arrived at Geneva according to schedule.	The activity of the ISSG Ceasefire Task Force resulted in the exchange of data on the violations of the COH.
7.	Create a mechanism to monitor the compliance of the COH.	Established a Centre for reconciliation of opposing sides in Syria, sent its representatives to all of the provinces in order to monitor the implementation of the agreements at the command points of the government forces, as well as to keep direct contact with provincial governors. Up to 70 UAV units, as well as aviation.	The assessment of the situation was carried out based on the information found in the social media and the press.	An objective monitoring system that would suit all the parties could not be created.
8.	Establish a hotline between the airbase at Khmeimim and the US military and political analysis group based in Amman (Jordan).	A direct communications line was established within the set timeframe.	By the unilateral decision of the US, contact with Amman was suspended starting from 28 July 2016, and the US military and political analysis group was disbanded.	Persistent appeals by the Russian Federation to the United States to put pressure on the violators of the COH have demonstrated the US lacks leverage to exert influence on the opposition forces.
9.	Promote a political transition in Syria.	Arranged for the inclusion of elders from 847 towns and villages and 69 units of "moderate" opposition into the reconciliation process. Contributed to the drafting of a new Syrian constitution.	Failed to persuade the "moderate" opposition to withdraw the ultimatum for Bashar al-Assad to resign before the elections.	The political process came to standstill.

Russia-US Agreement of 9 September 2016 on Reduction of Violence, Unimpeded and Sustained Humanitarian Access, and the Establishment of a Joint Implementation Centre
1.	Resume the Cessation of Hostilities (CoH) on the whole territory of Syria starting at 7 p.m. on 12 September 2016.	Made sure that the Syrian army observed the CoH. Monitored how the agreements were observed through video surveillance posting the feed online. Despite violations extended the CoH twice (48 and 72 hours). The CoH lasted 7 days altogether.	Failed to compel the "moderate" opposition to observe the CoH.	From 12-19 September 2016, "moderate" opposition groups violated the CoH 302 times. Civilian casualties: 83 dead, 252 injured. The Syrian Army lost 153 people.
2.	Set up a Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) checkpoint on Castello Road.	Set up a SARC checkpoint in the western section of Castello Road on 14 September 2016.	Failed to work with the "moderate" opposition to set up a checkpoint on Castello Road.	No access for the UN's humanitarian convoys.
3.	The Syrian army and "moderate" opposition forces pull back from Castello Road observing the following distances: tanks and artillery: 3 -3.5 km AFVs, heavy machine guns: 2.5 km troops with small arms: 1 km observation posts: 500 m	Began to pull back from Castello Road twice -- on 15-16 September 2016. Since the opposition didn't follow through on the obligations to pull back, the Syrian army units went back to their positions	Failed to compel the opposition forces to pull back from Castello Road.	No guarantee of safety for the UN's humanitarian convoys.
4.	Organize humanitarian aid deliveries to Aleppo	Set up 7 checkpoints for civilians to leave Aleppo and 1 checkpoint for armed rebels. Coordinated the UN's humanitarian aid deliveries	Rebels planted explosives in all exit points from Aleppo. Harassed civilians who tried to leave the city. Leaders of opposition groups refused to let UN humanitarian convoys through.	Civilians in Aleppo have no food, no medical supplies and no way out of the city.
5.	Establish a Joint Implementation Centre to plan joint operations against ISIS and the Al-Nusra Front.	Russian representatives arrived at the JIC, but could not commence deliberations due to a refusal from US representatives.	US representatives arrived at the JIC, but did not commence deliberations following instructions from Washington.	Joint planning of operations against ISIS and the Al-Nusra Front by Russian Aerospace Forces and USAF never launched.
6.	Launch joint operations against ISIS and the Al-Nusra Front.	Russian Aerospace Forces have single-handedly continued air strikes against ISIS and Al-Nusra targets (50 sorties, 140-150 air strikes a day on average).	The USAF has not attacked Al-Nusra targets. Their operations against ISIS average 12-15 sorties, 8-10 air strikes a day. On 17 September 2016, the USAF bombed Syrian Army positions near Deir ez-Zor, killing 62 and injuring more than 100 personnel.	Joint US-Russian operations against ISIS and the Al-Nusra Front never launched, allowing terrorists to retain control over a large territory and carry out offensive operations against government troops.

27Oct16

Comparative analysis provided by Russia of implementation of Russia-US agreement on Syria