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31Dec14

A Shift in the International Security Environment:
Potential Implications for Defense–Issues for Congress

Contents

Introduction

Background

Issues for Congress

Summary

World events since late 2013 have led some observers to conclude that the international security environment is undergoing a shift from the familiar post-Cold War era of the last 20-25 years, also sometimes known as the unipolar moment (with the United States as the unipolar power), to a new and different strategic situation that features, among other things, renewed great power competition and challenges to elements of the U.S.-led international order that has operated since World War II.

A shift in the international security environment could have significant implications for U.S. defense plans and programs. A previous shift in the international security environment--from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era--prompted a broad reassessment by the Department of Defense (DOD) and Congress of defense funding levels, strategy, and missions that led to numerous changes in DOD plans and programs.

A new shift in the international security environment could similarly have a number of implications for U.S. defense plans and programs. Of perhaps the greatest potential significance, such a shift could lead to a change in the current overall terms of debate over U.S. defense plans and programs. Russia's seizure and annexation of Crimea, as well as subsequent Russian actions in eastern Ukraine and elsewhere in Eastern Europe, have already led to a renewed focus among policy makers on maintaining and strengthening U.S. and NATO military capabilities in Europe, and on how to counter Russia's so-called "ambiguous warfare" tactics. China's actions in the East and South China Seas have prompted a focus among policy makers on how to counter China's so-called "salami-slicing" tactics in those areas. A shift in the international security environment may also be generating implications for areas such as nuclear weapons, submarines and antisubmarine warfare, and DOD reliance on Russian-made components.

Policy and oversight issues for Congress include the following:

  • Shift in strategic situations. Has there been a shift in the international security environment, and if so, what features characterize the new environment?
  • Reassessment of U.S. defense funding levels, strategy, and missions. Should there be a reassessment of U.S. defense funding levels, strategy, and missions?
  • Congressional role in reassessment. If there is to be such a reassessment, how should it be done, and what role should Congress play?
  • Potential effect on plans and programs. How might such a reassessment affect the current terms of debate on U.S. defense? What might be the potential implications for U.S. defense plans and programs?

Introduction

World events since late 2013 have led some observers to conclude that the international security environment is undergoing a shift from the familiar post-Cold War era of the last 20-25 years to a new and different strategic situation that features, among other things, renewed great power competition and challenges to elements of the U.S.-led international order that has operated since World War II. |1|

A shift in the international security environment could have significant implications for U.S. defense plans and programs. A previous shift in the international security environment--from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era--prompted a broad reassessment by the Department of Defense (DOD) and Congress of defense funding levels, strategy, and missions that led to numerous changes in DOD plans and programs.

The issue for Congress is whether a shift in the international security environment has occurred, and if so, how to respond to that shift. This report briefly describes the shift in the international security environment that some observers believe has occurred, and identifies some defense-related issues for Congress that could arise from it. Congress' decisions on these issues could have significant implications for U.S. defense capabilities and funding requirements.

This report focuses on defense-related issues and does not discuss potential implications of a shift in the international security environment for other policy areas, such as foreign policy and diplomacy, trade and finance, energy, and foreign assistance. Future CRS reports may address the potential implications of a shift in the international security environment for these other policy areas or address the U.S. role in the international security environment from other analytical perspectives.

Background

Shift in International Security Environment

Overview

World events since late 2013--including Chinese actions in the East and South China Seas since November 2013 |2| and Russia's seizure and annexation of Crimea in March 2014 |3|--have led some observers to conclude that the international security environment is undergoing a shift from the familiar post-Cold War era of the last 20-25 years, also known as the unipolar moment (with the United States as the unipolar power), to a new and different strategic situation that features, among other things, renewed great power competition and challenges to elements of the U.S.-led international order that has operated since World War II. |4| In August 2014, outg oing Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel referred to "the dangerous unpredictability of a world that is I think trying to define a new world order....We are seeing a new world order being built in the early 21st Century." |5| In October 2014, Hagel stated: "I think we are living through one of these historic, defining times.... We are seeing a new world order--post-World War II, post-Soviet implosion--being built." |6|

The Cold War, which is generally viewed as lasting from the late 1940s until the late 1980s/early 1990s, was generally viewed as a strongly bipolar situation featuring two superpowers--the United States and the Soviet Union--engaged in a political, ideological, and military competition for influence across multiple regions. The military component of that competition was often most acutely visible in Europe, where the U.S.-led NATO alliance and the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact alliance faced off against one another with large numbers of conventional forces and theater nuclear weapons, backed by longer-ranged strategic nuclear weapons.

The post-Cold War era, which is generally viewed as having begun in the early 1990s, tended toward a unipolar situation, with the United States as the world's sole superpower. The Warsaw Pact had disbanded, the Soviet Union had dissolved into Russia and the former Soviet republics, and neither Russia, China, nor any other country was viewed as posing a significant challenge to either the United States' status as the world's sole superpower or the U.S.-led international order. Compared to the Cold War, the post-Cold War era generally featured reduced levels of overt political, ideological, and military competition among major states. Following 9/11, the post-Cold War era was additionally characterized by a strong focus (at least from a U.S. perspective) on countering transnational terrorist organizations that had emerged as significant non-state actors, particularly Al Qaeda.

Some Emerging Features of New Situation

Observers who conclude that the international security environment has shifted to a new strategic situation generally view the new period not as a bipolar situation (like the Cold War) or a unipolar situation (like the post-Cold War era), but as a multipolar situation characterized by renewed competition among three major world powers--the United States, China, and Russia. Other emerging characteristics of the new international security situation as viewed by these observers include the following:

  • renewed ideological competition, this time against 21st-century forms of authoritarianism in Russia, China, and other countries; |7|
  • the promotion in China and Russia through their state-controlled media of nationalistic historical narratives emphasizing assertions of prior humiliation or victimization by Western powers, and the use of those narratives to support revanchist or irredentist foreign policy aims;
  • the use by Russia and China of new forms of aggressive or assertive military and paramilitary operations--called ambiguous warfare, among other terms, in the case of Russia's actions, and called salami-slicing tactics or gray-zone warfare, among other terms, in the case of China's actions--to gain greater degrees of control of areas on their peripheries;
  • challenges by Russia and China to key elements of the U.S.-led international order, including the principle that force or threat of force should not be used as a routine or first-resort measure for settling disputes between countries, and the principle that the world's oceans are to be treated as an international commons; and
  • alongside the above features, continued regional security challenges from countries such as Iran and North Korea, and a continuation of the post-Cold War era's focus (at least from a U.S. perspective) on countering transnational terrorist organizations that have emerged as significant non-state actors (now including the Islamic State organization, among other groups).

Markers of Shift to New Situation

For observers who conclude that the international security environment has shifted to a new strategic situation, the sharpest single marker of the shift arguably was Russia's seizure and annexation of Crimea in March 2014, which represented the first forcible seizure and annexation of one country's territory by another country in Europe since World War II. Other markers of the shift, such as Russia's actions in eastern Ukraine and elsewhere in Eastern Europe since March 2014, China's economic growth and military modernization over the last several years, and China's actions in the East and South China Seas over the last several years, have been more gradual and cumulative.

Some observers trace the beginnings of the argued shift in strategic situations back to 2008. In that year, Russia invaded and occupied part of the former Soviet republic Georgia without provoking a strong cost-imposing response from the United States and its allies. Also in that year, the financial crisis and resulting deep recessions in the United States and Europe, combined with China's ability to weather that crisis and its successful staging of the 2008 Summer Olympics, are seen by observers as having contributed to a perception in China of the United States as a declining power, and to a Chinese sense of self-confidence or triumphalism. |8| China's assertive actions in the East and South China Seas can be viewed as having begun (or accelerated) soon thereafter. |9|

Comparisons to Other Strategic Situations

Each strategic situation features a unique combination of major actors, dimensions of competition and cooperation among those actors, and military and other technologies available to them. A new strategic situation can have some similarities to previous ones, but it will also have differences, including, potentially, one or more features not present in any previous strategic situation. In the early years of a new strategic situation, some of its features may be unclear, in dispute, or not yet apparent. In attempting to understand a new strategic situation, comparisons to earlier ones are potentially helpful in identifying avenues of investigation. If applied too rigidly, however, such comparisons can act as intellectual straightjackets, making it more difficult to achieve a full understanding of a new strategic situation's characteristic features, particularly those that differentiate it from previous ones.

Some observers have stated that the world is entering a new Cold War. That term may have some utility in referring specifically to U.S.-Russian relations, because the new strategic situation that some observers have identified features competition and tension with Russia. Considered more broadly, however, the Cold War was a bipolar situation, while the new environment appears to be a multipolar situation that also includes China as a major competing power. The bipolarity of the Cold War, moreover, was reinforced by the opposing NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances, whereas in contrast, Russia today does not lead an equivalent of the Warsaw Pact. And while terrorists were a concern during the Cold War, the U.S. focus on countering transnational terrorist groups was not nearly as significant during the Cold War as it has been since 9/11.

Other observers, viewing the emerging multipolar situation, have drawn comparisons to the multipolar situation that existed in the 19th century and the years prior to World War I. Still others, observing both multipolarity and the promotion in China and Russia of nationalistic historical narratives supporting revanchist or irredentist foreign policy aims, have drawn comparisons to the 1930s. Those two earlier situations, however, did not feature a strong focus on countering globally significant transnational terrorist groups, and the military and other technologies available then differ vastly from those available today. The new strategic situation that some observers have identified may be similar in some respects to previous strategic situations, but it also differs from previous situations in certain respects, and might be best understood by direct observation and identification of its key features.

Grand Strategy and Geopolitics

The discussion of the shift in the international security environment that some observers have identified has led to a renewed emphasis in discussions of U.S. security and foreign policy on grand strategy and geopolitics. |10| From a U.S. perspective, grand strategy can be understood as strategy considered at a global or interregional level, as opposed to strategies for specific countries, regions, or issues. Geopolitics refers to the influence on international relations and strategy of basic world geographic features such as the size and location of continents, oceans, and individual countries.

From a U.S. perspective on grand strategy and geopolitics, it can be noted that most of the world's people, resources, and economic activity are located not in the Western Hemisphere, but in the other hemisphere, particularly Eurasia. In response to this basic feature of world geography, U.S. policy makers for the last several decades have chosen to pursue, as a key element of U.S. national strategy, a goal of preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon in one part of Eurasia or another, on the grounds that such a hegemon could represent a concentration of power strong enough to threaten core U.S. interests by, for example, denying the United States access to some of the other hemisphere's resources and economic activity. Although U.S. policy makers have not often stated this key national strategic goal explicitly in public, U.S. military (and diplomatic) operations in recent decades--both wartime operations and day-to-day operations--can be viewed as having been carried out in no small part in support of this key goal.

The U.S. goal of preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon in one part of Eurasia or another is a major reason why the U.S. military is structured with force elements that enable it to cross broad expanses of ocean and air space and then conduct sustained, large-scale military operations upon arrival. Force elements associated with this goal include, among other things, an Air Force with significant numbers of long-range bombers, long-range surveillance aircraft, long-range airlift aircraft, and aerial refueling tankers, and a Navy with significant numbers aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered attack submarines, large surface combatants, large amphibious ships, and underway replenishment ships.

Congressional Participation in Reassessment of U.S. Defense During Previous Shift

A previous shift in the international security environment--from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era--prompted a broad reassessment of defense funding levels, strategy, and missions that led to numerous changes in DOD plans and programs. Many of these changes were articulated in the 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR), |11| a reassessment of U.S. defense plans and programs whose very name conveyed the fundamental nature of the reassessment that had occurred. |12| In general, the BUR reshaped the U.S. military into a force that was smaller than the Cold War U.S. military, and oriented toward a planning scenario being able to conduct two major regional contingencies (MRCs) rather than the Cold War planning scenario of a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict. |13|

Through both committee activities and the efforts of individual Members, Congress played a significant role in the reassessment of defense funding levels, strategy, and missions that was prompted by the end of the Cold War. In terms of committee activities, the question of how to change U.S. defense plans and programs in response to the end of the Cold War was, for example, a major focus for the House and Senate Armed Services Committees in holding hearings and marking up annual national defense authorization acts in the early 1990s. |14|

In terms of efforts by individual Members, some Members put forth their own proposals for how much to reduce defense spending from the levels of the final years of the Cold War, while others put forth detailed proposals for future U.S. defense strategy, plans, programs, and spending. Senator John McCain, for example, issued a detailed, 32-page policy paper in November 1991 presenting his proposals for defense spending, missions, force structure, and weapon acquisition programs. |15|

Perhaps the most extensive individual effort by a Member to participate in the reassessment of U.S. defense following the end of the Cold War was the one carried out by Representative Les Aspin, the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. In early 1992, Aspin, supported by members of the committee's staff, devised a force-sizing construct and potential force levels and associated defense spending levels U.S. defense for the new post-Cold War era. A principal aim of Aspin's effort was to create an alternative to the "Base Force" plan for U.S. defense in the post-Cold War era that had been developed by the George H.W. Bush Administration. |16| Aspin's effort included a series of policy papers in January and February 1992 |17| that were augmented by press releases and speeches. Aspin's policy paper of February 25, 1992, served as the basis for his testimony that same day at a hearing on future defense spending before the House Budget Committee. Although DOD and some other observers (including some Members of Congress) criticized Aspin's analysis and proposals on various grounds, the effort arguably proved consequential the following year, when Aspin became Secretary of Defense in the new Clinton Administration. Aspin's 1992 effort helped inform his participation in DOD's 1993 BUR. The 1993 BUR in turn created a precedent for the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) process that remains in place today.

Potential or Emerging Implications for Defense

The shift in strategic situations that some observers have identified could have a number of implications for U.S. defense plans and programs, including those discussed briefly below.

Terms of Debate over U.S. Defense

Of perhaps the greatest potential significance, a shift from the post-Cold War era to a new strategic situation could lead to a change in the current overall terms of debate over U.S. defense plans and programs. The current terms of debate are shaped by things such as the limits on defense spending established under the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011 (S. 365/P.L. 112-25 of August 2, 2011) as amended, the defense strategic guidance document of January 2012, |18| and the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review. |19| If the current terms of debate largely reflect the features of the post-Cold War era, they may not be responsive to features of the new strategic situation that some observers have identified.

Some observers, citing recent world events, have raised the question of whether defense spending should be increased above levels set forth in the BCA, and consequently whether the BCA should be amended or repealed. |20| If policy makers judge that a shift in strategic situations of the kind discussed here is occurring, the nature of the U.S. response to that shift could lead to defense spending levels that are higher than, lower than, or about the same as those in the BCA.

U.S. and NATO Military Capabilities in Europe

Russia's seizure and annexation of Ukraine and Russia's subsequent actions in eastern Ukraine and elsewhere in Eastern Europe have led to a renewed focus among policy makers on maintaining and strengthening U.S. and NATO military capabilities in Europe. The United States, rather than continuing to implement earlier plans for reducing the U.S. military presence in Europe, has instead taken steps to bolster U.S. forces and operations in the region. In July 2014, the administration, as part of its FY2015 funding request for the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) part of DOD's budget, requested $1 billion for a European Reassurance Initiative, of which $925 million would be for DOD to carry out several force deployments and operations. |21|

At the September 4-5, 2014, NATO summit in Wales, NATO leaders announced a series of initiatives for refocusing NATO away from "out of area" (i.e., beyond-Europe) operations, and back toward a focus on territorial defense and deterrence in Europe itself. Among the announced initiatives was a defense capacity-building initiative for supporting partner countries outside the alliance and a readiness action plan for enabling a continuous NATO military presence on the alliance's periphery, particularly in the alliance's easternmost member states (i.e., the member states closest to Russia). |22| Officials in NATO countries are also considering whether to increase defense spending. Just prior to the NATO summit, it was reported that Russia would review its military strategy in response to NATO's new initiatives. |23|

The increased attention that U.S. policy makers are paying to the security situation in Europe, combined with U.S. military operations in the Middle East against the Islamic State organization and similar groups, has intensified preexisting questions among some observers about whether the United States will be able to fully implement the military component of the U.S. strategic rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region that was formally announced in the January 2012 defense strategic guidance document.

New Forms of Aggression and Assertiveness

Russia's seizure and annexation of Crimea, as well as subsequent Russian actions in eastern Ukraine and elsewhere in Eastern Europe, have already led to a renewed focus among policy makers on maintaining and strengthening U.S. and NATO military capabilities in Europe, and on how to counter Russia's so-called "ambiguous warfare" tactics. |24| China's actions in the East and South China Seas have prompted a focus among policy makers on how to counter China's so-called "salami-slicing" tactics in those areas. |25|

Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Deterrence

Russia's reassertion of its status as a major world power has included, among other things, references by Russian officials to nuclear weapons and Russia's status as a major nuclear weapon power. |26| This has led to an increased emphasis in discussions of U.S. defense and security on nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence |27|--a development that comes at a time when DOD is in the early stages of a multi-year plan to spend scores of billions of dollars to modernize U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent forces. |28| DOD, for example, currently has plans to acquire a new class of ballistic missile submarines |29| and a new long-range bomber. |30|

Submarines and Antisubmarine Warfare

The growing capabilities and operations of China's submarine fleet, |31| combined with a stated intention by Russia to rebuild its navy (including its submarine force) and renewed Russian submarine operations (including a suspected Russian submarine incursion in Swedish waters in October 2014), have led to a renewed focus in discussions of U.S. defense and security on the value of the U.S. attack submarine force for preserving U.S. command of the seas on the global basis, and on U.S. and allied antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. |32| This could lead to an increased focus on the procurement of Virginia-class submarines |33| and ASW platforms and equipment, including (to cite just two examples), P-8 Poseidon multi-mission aircraft and ASW equipment for Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs). |34|

Reliance on Russian-Made Components

Increased tensions with Russia have led to an interest in eliminating instances of being dependent on Russian-made military systems and components for U.S. military systems. A current case in point concerns the Russian-made RD-180 rocket engine, which is incorporated into U.S. space launch rockets, including rockets used by DOD to put military payloads into orbit. |35|

Issues for Congress

Potential policy and oversight issues for Congress include the following:

  • Shift in strategic situation. Has there been a shift in the international security environment, and if so, what features characterize the new environment?
  • Reassessment of U.S. defense funding levels, strategy, and missions. Should there be a reassessment of U.S. defense funding levels, strategy, and missions?
  • Congressional role in reassessment. If there is to be such a reassessment, how should it be done, and what role should Congress play? Should Congress conduct the reassessment itself, through committee activities? Should Congress establish the terms of reference for a reassessment to be conducted by the executive branch or by an independent, third-party entity (such as a blue ribbon panel)? Should some combination of these approaches be employed?
  • Potential effect on plans and programs. How might such a reassessment affect the current terms of debate on U.S. defense? What might be the potential implications for U.S. defense plans and programs?
  • U.S. and NATO military capabilities in Europe. Are the United States and its NATO allies taking appropriate steps regarding U.S. and NATO military capabilities and operations in Europe? What potential impacts would a strengthened U.S. military presence in Europe have on total U.S. military force structure requirements? What impact would it have on DOD's ability to implement the military component of the U.S. strategic rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific region?
  • New forms of aggression and assertiveness. Do the United States and its allies and partners have an adequate strategy for countering Russia's so-called ambiguous warfare in eastern Ukraine and China's so-called salami-slicing tactics in the East and South China Seas?
  • Nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence. Are current DOD plans for modernizing U.S. strategic nuclear weapons, and for numbers and basing of non-strategic (i.e., theater-range) nuclear weapons aligned with the needs of the new strategic situation?
  • Submarines and antisubmarine warfare. Are current Navy plans for numbers and capabilities of attack submarines, and ASW capabilities, aligned with the needs of the new strategic situation?
  • Reliance on Russian-made components. Aside from the Russian-made RD-180 rocket engine, what other Russian-made components, if any, are incorporated into DOD equipment? What are DOD's plans regarding reliance on Russian-made components for DOD equipment?
[Source: By Ronald O'Rourke, Congressional Research Service, R43838, Washington D.C., 31Dec14. Ronald O'Rourke is a Specialist in Naval Affairs.]

Notes:

1. The term international order generally means the combination of laws, rules, norms, and supporting institutions that shapes and helps govern international politics and economics. The U.S.-led international order established at the end of World War II, also known as the liberal international order, can be characterized as one that features, among other things, a reliance on international law rather than force or coercion as the preferred means of settling international disputes, an emphasis on human rights, an open international trading system that attempts to evolve in the direction of free trade, and the treatment of the world's oceans, international airspace, outer space, and cyberspace as international commons. [Back]

2. For discussions of these actions, see CRS Report R42784, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke, and CRS Report R42930, Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia: Issues for Congress, by Ben Dolven, Mark E. Manyin, and Shirley A. Kan. [Back]

3. For further discussion Russia's seizure and annexation of Crimea, see CRS Report RL33460, Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy, by Steven Woehrel. [Back]

4. See, for example, Walter Russell Mead, "The End of History Ends," The American Interest, December 2, 2013; Paul David Miller, "Crimea Proves That Great Power Rivalry Never Left Us," Foreign Policy, March 21, 2014; Walter Russell Mead, "The Return of Geopolitics," Foreign Affairs, May/June 2014; Robert Kagan, "Superpowers Don't Get to Retire," New Republic, May 26, 2014; James Kitfield, "The New Great Power Triangle Tilt: China, Russia Vs. U.S.," Breaking Defense, June 19, 2014; Lilia Shevtsova, "Putin Ends the Interregnum," The American Interest, August 28, 2014; David E. Sanger, "Commitments on Three Fronts Test Obama's Foreign Policy," New York Times, September 3, 2014; Steven Erlanger, "NATO's Hopes for Russia Have Turned to Dismay," New York Times, September 12, 2014; Richard N. Haass, "The Era of Disorder," Project Syndicate, October 27, 2014. [Back]

5. As quoted in Chris Uhlmann, "US Secretary of Defense Says 'New World Order Being Built,'" Australian Broadcasting Corporation, August 11, 2014. [Back]

6. As quoted in David A. Graham, "Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel: Get Used to Endless War," The Atlantic, October 29, 2014. In September 2014, Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work stated:

    I think there's two things happening, both with Russia and China. First, they clearly are staking out their position in their near abroads. And this is one of the things that we're going to have to work out over the course of the next several years on what they consider to be areas of their vital interest, and what we have to do is find a means by which to make sure that those desires do not resort to the use of force and would require an overt response militarily from us. We have to work these out and make sure that Russia and China feel secure in their near abroads. But both of those countries definitely believe that the current world order, as established over the last 70 years, they would like to change certain aspects of it. So that's going to be a constant point of attention. So at the strategic level, it is, how are we going to work with two very strong powers, regional powers right now? And how will we be able to work out ways in which we engage with each other over time?

(Department of Defense news transcript, "Deputy Secretary of Defense Work Delivers Remarks at the Council on Foreign Relations," September 30, 2014, accessed October 31, 2014, at: http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=5509.) [Back]

7. See, for example, Anne Applebaum, "Russia's Anti-Western Ideology Has Global Consequences," Washington Post, March 28, 2014; Paula J. Dobriansky, "U.S. Needs A Strong Moral Narrative To Combat Putin," Washington Post, May 23, 2014; Christopher Walker, "Authoritarian Regimes Are Changing How The World Defines Democracy," Washington Post, June 13, 2014; Lilia Shevtsova, "Crowning a Winner in the Post-Crimea World," The American Interest, June 16, 2014; Timothy Garton Ash, "Putin's Deadly Doctrine," New York Times, July 18, 2014; Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of Putinism," Washington Post, July 31, 2014; David Brooks, "The Battle of the Regimes," New York Times, August 4, 2014; Robert Tracinski, "Putinism and the 'Battle of Regimes,'" The Federalist, August 14, 2014; Anders Fogh Rasmussen, "The Dual Threats to Western Values," Wall Street Journal, September 15, 2014; Jeremy Page, "Why Russia's President Is 'Putin the Great' in China," New York Times, October 1, 2014; Yigal Schleifer, "Hungary At The Turning Point," Slate, October 3, 2014; Margit Feher, "Prompted by U.S. Comments, Hungary Insists It respects Democracy," Wall Street Journal, October 3, 2014; Krizstina Than, "U.S. Diplomat Criticizes PM Orban's Russia Policies," Reuters, October 24, 2014; Zoran Radosavljevik and Krizstina Than, "Washington Tries To Check Hungary's Drift Into Kremlin Orbit," Reuters, November 1, 2014. [Back]

8. See, for example, Howard W. French, "China's Dangerous Game," The Atlantic, October 13, 2014. [Back]

9. Some observers trace the roots of the end of the post-Cold War era further, to years prior to 2008; see, for example, Walter Russell Mead, "Who's to Blame for a World in Flames?" The American Interest, October 6, 2014. [Back]

10. See, for example, William C. Martel, "Why America Needs a Grand Strategy," The Diplomat, June 18, 2012; Aaron David Miller, "The Naivete of Distance," Foreign Policy, March 31, 2014; Robert Kaplan, "The Gift of American Power," Real Clear World, May 15, 2014; William C. Martel, "America's Grand Strategy Disaster," The National Interest, June 9, 2014; Adam Garfinkle, "The Silent Death of American Grand Strategy," American Review, 2014; William Ruger, "A Realist's Guide to Grand Strategy," The American Conservative, August 26, 2014; Barry R. Posen, Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy, Cornell University Press, 2014, 256 pp. (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs); R. D. Hooker, The Grand Strategy of the United States, Washington, National Defense University Press, October 2014, 35 pp. (INSS Strategic Monograph, Institute for National Strategic Studies); F.G. Hoffman, "Grand Strategy: The Fundamental Considerations," Orbis, Volume 58, Issue 4 (Fall 2014), 2014: 472^485; Michael Page, "Is 'Restraint' a Realistic Grand Strategy?" Cicero Magazine, October 21, 2014; Bryan McGrath, "Unconstrained Grand Strategy," War on the Rocks October 28, 2014. [Back]

11. See, for example, Department of Defense, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, October 1993, 109 pp. [Back]

12. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin's introduction to DOD's report on the 1993 BUR states:

    In March 1993, I initiated a comprehensive review of the nation's defense strategy, force structure, modernization, infrastructure, and foundations. I felt that a department-wide review needed to be conducted "from the bottom up" because of the dramatic changes that have occurred in the world as a result of the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. These changes in the international security environment have fundamentally altered America's security needs. Thus, the underlying premise of the Bottom-Up Review was that we needed to reassess all of our defense concepts, plans, and programs from the ground up.

(Department of Defense, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, October 1993, p. iii.) [Back]

13. For additional discussion of the results of the BUR, see CRS Report 93-839 F, Defense Department Bottom-Up Review: Results and Issues, October 6, 1993, 6 pp., by Edward F. Bruner, and CRS Report 93-627 F, Defense Department Bottom-Up Review: The Process, July 2, 1993, 9 pp., by Cedric W. Tarr, Jr. [both nondistributable and available from the authors of this report]. [Back]

14. See, for example:

  • the House Armed Services Committee's report on the FY1991 National Defense Authorization Act (H.Rept. 101-665 of August 3, 1990, on H.R. 4739), pp. 7-14;
  • the Senate Armed Services Committee's report on the FY1991 National Defense Authorization Act (S.Rept. 101-384 of July 20 (legislative day, July 10), 1990, on S. 2884), pp. 8-36;
  • the House Armed Services Committee's report on the FY1992 and FY1993 National Defense Authorization Act (H.Rept. 102-60 of May 13, 1991, on H.R. 2100), pp. 8 and 13;
  • the Senate Armed Services Committee's report on the FY1992 and FY1993 National Defense Authorization Act (S.Rept. 102-113 of July 19 (legislative day, July 8), 1991, on S. 1507), pp. 8-9;
  • the House Armed Services Committee's report on the FY1993 National Defense Authorization Act (H.Rept. 102-527 of May 19, 1992, on H.R. 5006), pp. 8-10, 14-15, and 22;
  • the Senate Armed Services Committee's report on the FY1993 National Defense Authorization Act (S.Rept. 102- 352 of July 31 (legislative day, July 23), 1992, on S. 3114), pp. 7-12;
  • the House Armed Services Committee's report on the FY1994 National Defense Authorization Act (H.Rept. 103- 200 of July 30, 1993, on H.R. 2401), pp. 8-9 and 18-19;
  • the House Armed Services Committee's report on the FY1995 National Defense Authorization Act (H.Rept. 103-499 of May 10, 1994, on H.R. 4301), pp. 7 and 9;
  • the Senate Armed Services Committee's report on the FY1995 National Defense Authorization Act (S.Rept. 103- 282 of June 14 (legislative day, June 7), 1994, on S. 2182), pp. 8-9; and
  • the House Armed Services Committee's report on the FY1996 National Defense Authorization Act (H.Rept. 104- 131 of June 1, 1995, on H.R. 1530), pp. 6-7 and 11-12. [Back]

15. Senator John McCain, Matching A Peace Dividend With National Security, A New Strategy For The 1990s, November 1991, 32 pp. [Back]

16. For more on the Base Force, see CRS Report 92-493 S, National Military Strategy, The DoD Base Force, and U.S. Unified Command Plan, June 11, 1992, 68 pp., by John M. Collins [nondistributable and available from the authors of this report]. [Back]

17. These policy papers included the following:

  • National Security in the 1990s: Defining a New Basis for U.S. Military Forces, Rep. Les Aspin, Chairman, House Armed Services Committee, Before the Atlantic Council of the United States, January 6, 1992, 23 pp.;
  • An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces For the Post-Soviet Era, Rep. Les Aspin, Chairman, House Armed Services Committee, January 24, 2991, 20 pp.;
  • Tomorrow's Defense From Today's Industrial Base: Finding the Right Resource Strategy For A New Era, by Rep. Les Aspin, Chairman, House Armed Services Committee, Before the American Defense Preparedness Association, February 12, 1992, 20 pp.; and
  • An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces For the Post-Soviet Era, Four Illustrative Options, Rep. Les Aspin, Chairman, House Armed Services Committee, February 25, 1992, 27 pp. [Back]

18. Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 2012, 8 pp. For additional discussion, see CRS Report R42146, Assessing the January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG): In Brief, by Catherine Dale and Pat Towell. [Back]

19. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, 64 pp. For additional discussion, see CRS Report R43403, The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and Defense Strategy: Issues for Congress, by Catherine Dale. [Back]

20. See, for example, John T. Bennett, "Could Global Threat Picture Restore US Defense Increases?" Defense News, August 31, 2014; Charles Lane, "The U.S. Needs To Get Serious About Defense Spending," Washington Post, September 3, 2014; Robert J. Samuelson, "America's Neglected Defense," Washington Post, September 7, 2014; Michele Flournoy and Eric Edelman, "Cuts To Defense Spending Are Hurting Our National Security," Washington Post, September 19, 2014; Mackenzie Eaglen, "GOP, Dems Must Rebuild Military Readiness," Breaking Defense, September 26, 2014; Ron Haskins and Michael O'Hanlon, "Commentary: Stop Sequestering Defense," Defense News, October 13, 2014; Merrill D'Arezzo, "Experts Call For National Debate On U.S. Military Priorities,"Military Times, October 23, 2104; Martin Matishak and Rebecca Shabad, "Defense Hopes For Sequester Relief," The Hill, October 26, 2014; James Jay Carafano. [Back]

21. Prepared Statement of the Honorable Robert O. Work, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Admiral James A. Winnefeld, Jr, USN, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Before the House Armed Services Committee on the FY2015 Overseas Contingency Operations Budget Request for the Department of Defense, Wednesday, July 16, 2014, pp. 2, 4-5. [Back]

22. For additional discussion, see CRS Report R43698, NATO's Wales Summit: Outcomes and Key Challenges, by Paul Belkin. [Back]

23. Karoun Demirjian and Daniela Deane, "Moscow Will Review Military Strategy in Face of NATO Plan for Rapid-Reaction Force," Washington Post, September 2, 2014. [Back]

24. See, for example, Jackson Diehl, "Ukraine's Wake-Up Call for NATO," Washington Post, April 27, 2014; Peter Pomerantsev, "How Putin Is Reinventing Warfare," Foreign Policy, May 5, 2014; Frank Hoffman, "On Not-So-New Warfare: Political Warfare Vs. Hybrid Threats," War on the Rocks, July 28, 2014; Masha Gessen, "The Putin Military Doctrine," Slate, August 15, 2014; Peter Apps, "'Ambiguous Warfare' Providing NATO With New Challenge," Reuters, August 21, 2014; Paul Huard, "'Maskirovka' Is Russian Secret War," War Is Boring, August 25, 2014; Sam Jones, "Ukraine: Russia's New Art of War," Financial Times, August 28, 2014; Uri Friedman, "Russia's Slow-Motion Invasion of Ukraine, Is Russia Waging A New Form of Warfare, Or A Very Old One?" The Atlantic, August 29, 2014; Matthew Gault, "NATO Is Acting Like It's 1985; Old Alliance Needs New Ideas To Combat Russian Secret War," War Is Boring, August 30, 2014; Jakub Grygiel and A. Weiss Mitchell, "Limited War Is Back," The National Interest, September 1, 2014. [Back]

25. Jackson Diehl, "China's 'Creeping Invasion,'" Washington Post, September 14, 2014; Joe Gould, "US Military Girds for More 'Unconventional Warfare," Defense News, October 24, 2014; Douglas Mastriano, "Defeating Putin's Strategy of Ambiguity," War on the Rocks, November 6, 2014. See also CRS Report R42784, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. [Back]

26. See, for example, Jeffrey Tayler, "Putin's Nuclear Option," Foreign Policy, September 4, 2014; Alexei Anishchuk, "Putin Warns U.S. Spay Over Ukraine Threatens Global Stability," Reuters, October 15, 2014. [Back]

27. See, for example, Ralph Vartabedian and W.J. Hennigan, "NATO Nuclear Drawdown Now Seems Unlikely," Los Angeles Times, September 19, 2014; William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, "U.S. Ramping Up Major Renewal in Nuclear Arms," New York Times, September 21, 2014; Bill Sweetman, "Opinion: Nuclear Deterrence Back On The Policy Menu," Aviation Week & Space Technology, September 29, 2014; Robert Spalding III and Adam Lowther, "It's Time to Talk About Nukes Again," Real Clear Defense, October 23, 2014. [Back]

28. See, for example, William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, "U.S. Ramping Up Major Renewal in Nuclear Arms," New York Times, September 21, 2014; CRS Report RL33640, U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf, and Congressional Budget Office, Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2014 to 2023, December 2013, 21 pp. [Back]

29. CRS Report R41129, Navy Ohio Replacement (SSBNfXJ) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. [Back]

30. CRS Report R43049, U.S. Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress, by Jeremiah Gertler. [Back]

31. For a discussion of China's submarine fleet, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities--Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. [Back]

32. See, for example, Jeff W. Benson, "Opinion: A New Era in Anti-Submarine Warfare," USNI News, August 27, 2014; Kris Osborn, "US Navy Issues Warnings on Russia, China's Submarine Fleets, Military.com, September 20, 2014; Karl Ritter and Matti Huuhtanen (Associated Press), "Submarine Hunt Sends Cold War Chill Across Baltic," Washington Post, October 20, 2014; Kris Osborn, "CNO Warms of Advanced Russian Submarine Development," Military.com, October 23, 2014; James R. Holmes, "Relearning Anti-Submarine Warfare," The Diplomat, October 30, 2014; Sam LaGrone, "CNO Greenert: Russian Navy 'Very Busy in the Undersea Domain,'" USNI News, November 4, 2014. [Back]

33. For a discussion of the Virginia-class program, see CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. [Back]

34. For a discussion of the LCS program, see CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. [Back]

35. For a discussion, see CRS Insights, Russian Sanctions Reprisal Against the RD-180 Rocket Engine: Paths Ahead for U.S. National Security Space Launch, by Steven A. Hildreth, May 27, 2014. See also Daniel Goure, "With A New Cold War Beginning, Reliance On Russia For Rocket Engines Is Madness," Lexington Institute, August 7, 2014; David A. Deptula, "The Russians Have Us Over a Rocket," Wall Street Journal, October 23, 2014. [Back]

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